LEADER 04889nam 2200685Ia 450 001 9910459770003321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-8014-7806-5 010 $a0-8014-5761-0 010 $a0-8014-5885-4 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801458859 035 $a(CKB)2670000000079132 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000488424 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11328898 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000488424 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10450826 035 $a(PQKB)11171999 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3137968 035 $a(DE-B1597)527339 035 $a(OCoLC)726824226 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801458859 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse58496 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3137968 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10457589 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL759694 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000079132 100 $a20090722d2010 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aWhy intelligence fails$b[electronic resource] $elessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War /$fRobert Jervis 210 $aIthaca $cCornell University Press$d2010 215 $aix, 238 p 225 1 $aCornell studies in security affairs 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a1-336-28408-0 311 $a0-8014-4785-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aAdventures in intelligence -- Failing to see that the Shah was in danger : introduction, postmortem, and CIA comments -- Analysis of NFAC's performance on Iran's domestic crisis, mid-1977-7 November 1978 -- CIA comments on the report -- The Iraq WMD intelligence failure : what everyone knows is wrong -- The politics and psychology of intelligence and intelligence reform. 330 $aThe U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations-analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind-were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved. 410 0$aCornell studies in security affairs. 606 $aIntelligence service$zUnited States$xEvaluation$vCase studies 606 $aIraq War, 2003-2011$xMilitary intelligence$zUnited States$xEvaluation 606 $aWeapons of mass destruction$zIraq 607 $aIran$xHistory$yRevolution, 1979 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aIntelligence service$xEvaluation 615 0$aIraq War, 2003-2011$xMilitary intelligence$xEvaluation. 615 0$aWeapons of mass destruction 676 $a955.05/3 700 $aJervis$b Robert$f1940-$0247628 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910459770003321 996 $aWhy intelligence fails$92464451 997 $aUNINA