LEADER 04429nam 2200805 a 450 001 9910459282203321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-282-64175-1 010 $a9786612641756 010 $a1-4008-3701-4 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400837014 035 $a(CKB)2670000000031895 035 $a(EBL)557133 035 $a(OCoLC)650308547 035 $a(SSID)ssj0001062692 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12460054 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001062692 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)11017337 035 $a(PQKB)10853443 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000425615 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11281195 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000425615 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10372526 035 $a(PQKB)11179200 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC557133 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36474 035 $a(DE-B1597)446360 035 $a(OCoLC)979593510 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400837014 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL557133 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10397708 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL264175 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000031895 100 $a20041206d2005 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aPolitical power and corporate control$b[electronic resource] $ethe new global politics of corporate governance /$fPeter Alexis Gourevitch and James J. Shinn 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton $cPrinceton University Press$dc2005 215 $a1 online resource (365 p.) 300 $aIncludes statistical evidence from a sample of 39 countries, with detailed narratives of nine specific country cases. 311 $a0-691-12291-1 311 $a0-691-13381-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [313]-332) and index. 327 $aIntroduction and summary argument -- Governance patterns: what causes what? -- Framing incentives: the economics and law tradition -- Politics: preferences and institutions -- Preference cleavages 1: class conflict -- Preference cleavages 2: sectoral conflict -- Preference cleavages 3: transparency, voice, and pensions -- Conclusion : going forward. 330 $aWhy does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another. 606 $aCorporate governance 606 $aCorporations$xInvestor relations 606 $aBusiness and politics 606 $aCorporations$xPolitical activity 606 $aInternational finance 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aCorporate governance. 615 0$aCorporations$xInvestor relations. 615 0$aBusiness and politics. 615 0$aCorporations$xPolitical activity. 615 0$aInternational finance. 676 $a338.6 700 $aGourevitch$b Peter Alexis$0134960 701 $aShinn$b James$0973384 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910459282203321 996 $aPolitical power and corporate control$92466443 997 $aUNINA