LEADER 03694nam 2200697 a 450 001 9910459192903321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-282-66567-7 010 $a9786612665677 010 $a1-4008-2532-6 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400825325 035 $a(CKB)2670000000033340 035 $a(EBL)557139 035 $a(OCoLC)654029530 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000444638 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12160633 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000444638 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10471025 035 $a(PQKB)10303162 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC557139 035 $a(OCoLC)680616265 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36353 035 $a(DE-B1597)446456 035 $a(OCoLC)979725357 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400825325 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL557139 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10402724 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL266567 035 $a(EXLCZ)992670000000033340 100 $a20020128d2002 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aWelfare and rational care$b[electronic resource] /$fStephen Darwall 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton, N.J. $cPrinceton University Press$dc2002 215 $a1 online resource (146 p.) 225 1 $aPrinceton monographs in philosophy 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-09252-4 311 $a0-691-09253-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [123]-131) and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tCHAPTER I: Welfare's Normativity -- $tCHAPTER II: Welfare and Care -- $tCHAPTER III: Empathy, Sympathy, Care -- $tCHAPTER IV: Valuing Activity: Golub's Smile -- $tNotes -- $tReferences -- $tIndex 330 $aWhat kind of life best ensures human welfare? Since the ancient Greeks, this question has been as central to ethical philosophy as to ordinary reflection. But what exactly is welfare? This question has suffered from relative neglect. And, as Stephen Darwall shows, it has done so at a price. Presenting a provocative new "rational care theory of welfare," Darwall proves that a proper understanding of welfare fundamentally changes how we think about what is best for people. Most philosophers have assumed that a person's welfare is what is good from her point of view, namely, what she has a distinctive reason to pursue. In the now standard terminology, welfare is assumed to have an "agent-relative normativity." Darwall by contrast argues that someone's good is what one should want for that person insofar as one cares for her. Welfare, in other words, is normative, but not peculiarly for the person whose welfare is at stake. In addition, Darwall makes the radical proposal that something's contributing to someone's welfare is the same thing as its being something one ought to want for her own sake, insofar as one cares. Darwall defends this theory with clarity, precision, and elegance, and with a subtle understanding of the place of sympathetic concern in the rich psychology of sympathy and empathy. His forceful arguments will change how we understand a concept central to ethics and our understanding of human bonds and human choices. 410 0$aPrinceton monographs in philosophy. 606 $aEthics 606 $aContentment 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aEthics. 615 0$aContentment. 676 $a177/.7 700 $aDarwall$b Stephen L.$f1946-$01054000 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910459192903321 996 $aWelfare and rational care$92486299 997 $aUNINA