LEADER 03940nam 2200673Ia 450 001 9910458640703321 005 20210603031839.0 010 $a1-281-22385-9 010 $a9786611223854 010 $a0-226-53682-3 024 7 $a10.7208/9780226536828 035 $a(CKB)1000000000402382 035 $a(EBL)408217 035 $a(OCoLC)290521149 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000128133 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11139808 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000128133 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10063379 035 $a(PQKB)11439595 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC408217 035 $a(DE-B1597)535743 035 $a(OCoLC)781253327 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780226536828 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL408217 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10216925 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL122385 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000402382 100 $a19991220d2000 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurun#---|u||u 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 00$aConcentrated corporate ownership$b[electronic resource] /$fedited by Randall Morck 210 $aChicago $cUniversity of Chicago Press$dc2000 215 $a1 online resource (404 p.) 225 1 $aA National Bureau of Economic Research conference report 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 0 $a0-226-53678-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tNational Bureau of Economic Research --$tContents --$tForeword --$tAcknowledgments --$tIntroduction --$t1. The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success: Organizational Structure, Incentives, and Complementarities --$t2. Ownership Structures and the Decision to Go Public: Private versus Social Optimality --$t3. Some of the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Ownership Concentration in Canada --$t4. Corporations and Taxation: A Largely Private Matter? --$t5. Constraints on Large-Block Shareholders --$t6. Trust and Opportunism in Close Corporations --$t7. Waiting for the Omelette to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression --$t8. Adverse Selection and Gains to Controllers in Corporate Freezeouts --$t9. Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Intermediaries, and Corporate Governance --$t10. Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights --$t11. Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth The Canadian Disease? --$tContributors --$tName Index --$tSubject Index 330 $aStandard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising. What corporate governance problems arise in tightly held firms? How do these differ from corporate governance problems in widely held firms? How do control blocks arise and how are they maintained? How does concentrated ownership affect economic growth? How should we regulate tightly held firms? Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy. 410 0$aConference report (National Bureau of Economic Research) 606 $aCorporate governance 606 $aIndustrial concentration 606 $aStock ownership 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aCorporate governance. 615 0$aIndustrial concentration. 615 0$aStock ownership. 676 $a338.7 701 $aMorck$b Randall$0964663 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910458640703321 996 $aConcentrated corporate ownership$92188643 997 $aUNINA