LEADER 03886nam 2200745Ia 450 001 9910458286203321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-262-26447-1 010 $a1-282-69477-4 010 $a9786612694776 010 $a0-262-25922-2 024 8 $a9786612694776 024 3 $a9780262259224 035 $a(CKB)2560000000007137 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000340325 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11247531 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000340325 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10387048 035 $a(PQKB)10004091 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0000131002 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3339088 035 $a(OCoLC)503092562$z(OCoLC)643588851$z(OCoLC)646839596$z(OCoLC)663077471$z(OCoLC)748590943$z(OCoLC)961543323$z(OCoLC)963723092$z(OCoLC)966233333$z(OCoLC)988438542$z(OCoLC)992033207$z(OCoLC)1000437705$z(OCoLC)1004384667$z(OCoLC)1055377730$z(OCoLC)1066573790$z(OCoLC)1081296515 035 $a(OCoLC-P)503092562 035 $a(MaCbMITP)8434 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3339088 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10340971 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL269477 035 $a(OCoLC)816568715 035 $a(EXLCZ)992560000000007137 100 $a20090316d2009 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aMental reality$b[electronic resource] /$fGalen Strawson 205 $a2nd ed., with a new appendix. 210 $aCambridge, MA $cMIT Press$d2009 215 $a1 online resource (xx, 373 p.) $cill 225 1 $aRepresentation and mind series 300 $a"A Bradford book." 311 $a0-262-51310-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 330 $a"In Mental reality, Galen Strawson argues that much contemporary philosophy of mind gives undue primacy of place to publicly observable phenomena, nonmental phenomena, and behavioral phenomena (understood as publicly observable phenomena) in its account of the nature of mind. It does so at the expense of the phenomena of conscious experience. Strawson describes an alternative position, "naturalized Cartesianism," which couples the materialist view that mind is entirely natural and wholly physical with a fully realist account of the nature of conscious experience. Naturalized Cartesianism is an adductive (as opposed to reductive) form of materialism. Adductive materialists don't claim that conscious experience is anything less than we ordinarily conceive it to be, in being wholly physical. They claim instead that the physical is something more than we ordinarily conceive it to be, given that many of the wholly physical goings on in the brain constitute--literally are--conscious experiences as we ordinarily conceive them. Since naturalized Cartesianism downgrades the place of reference to nonmental and publicly observable phenomena in an adequate account of mental phenomena, Strawson considers in detail the question of what part such reference still has to play. He argues that it is a mistake to think that all behavioral phenomena are publicly observable phenomena. This revised and expanded edition of Mental Reality includes a new appendix, which thoroughly revises the account of intentionality given in chapter 7"--MIT CogNet. 410 0$aRepresentation and mind. 606 $aConsciousness 606 $aBehaviorism (Psychology) 606 $aMind and body 606 $aMaterialism 606 $aPhilosophy of mind 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aConsciousness. 615 0$aBehaviorism (Psychology) 615 0$aMind and body. 615 0$aMaterialism. 615 0$aPhilosophy of mind. 676 $a128/.2 700 $aStrawson$b Galen$0953504 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910458286203321 996 $aMental reality$92156020 997 $aUNINA