LEADER 04463nam 22006971 450 001 9910458222203321 005 20070605174156.0 010 $a1-4725-6386-7 010 $a1-281-08273-2 010 $a9786611082734 010 $a1-84731-344-2 024 7 $a10.5040/9781472563866 035 $a(CKB)1000000000398974 035 $a(EBL)317913 035 $a(OCoLC)476111457 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000128999 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12045673 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000128999 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10069778 035 $a(PQKB)11099028 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1778891 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC317913 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1778891 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10276162 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL108273 035 $a(OCoLC)646796921 035 $a(UtOrBLW)bpp09256529 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL317913 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000398974 100 $a20140929d2007 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aConsent in the law /$fDeryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aOxford :$cHart Publishing,$d2007. 215 $a1 online resource (406 p.) 225 1 $aLegal theory today 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-84113-679-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $a1 Consent in the Law: A Preliminary Examination -- PART ONE: A GEWIRTHIAN APPROACH TO CONSENT IN THE LAW. 2 The Principle of Generic Consistency: Its Justification and Application ; 3 The Functions of Consent in the Law -- PART TWO: CONSENT IN THE LAW I: QUESTIONS OF ADEQUACY. 4 Subjects of Consent: Questions of Capacity and Competence ; 5 The Conditions of (Valid) Consent I: Unforced and Informed Choice ; 6 The Conditions of Consent II: Duress, Undue Influence, and Disclosure ; 7 Questions of Signalling and Scope, Withdrawal, and Refusal -- PART THREE: CONSENT IN THE LAW II: QUESTIONS OF NECESSITY AND SUFFICIENCY. 8 The Necessity, Sufficiency, and Relevance of Consent I: Private Wrong and Private Empowerment ; 9 The Necessity, Sufficiency, and Relevance of Consent II: Public Wrong -- PART FOUR: CONSENT AS THE BASIS OF LEGAL (POLITICAL) AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION. 10 Consent and the Stability and Authority of Law ; 11 Consent as Procedural Justification: Concluding Remark. 330 $a"In a community that takes rights seriously, consent features pervasively in both moral and legal discourse as a justifying reason: stated simply, where there is consent, there can be no complaint. However, without a clear appreciation of the nature of a consent-based justification, its integrity, both in principle and in practice, is liable to be compromised. This book examines the role of consent as a procedural justification, discussing the prerequisites for an adequate consent -- in particular, that an agent with the relevant capacity has made an unforced and informed choice, that the consent has been clearly signalled, and that the scope of the authorisation covers the act in question. It goes on to highlight both the Fallacy of Necessity (where there is no consent, there must be a wrong) and the Fallacy of Sufficiency (where there is consent, there cannot be a wrong). Finally, the extent to which the authority of law itself rests on consent is considered. If the familiarity of consent-based justification engenders confusion and contempt, the analysis in this book acts as a corrective, identifying a range of abusive or misguided practices that variously under-value or over-value consent, that fictionalise it or that are fixated by it, and that treat it too casually or too cautiously. In short, the analysis in Consent in the Law points the way towards recognising an important procedural justification for precisely what it is as well as giving it a more coherent application."--Bloomsbury Publishing. 410 0$aLegal theory today. 606 $aConsent (Law) 606 $aLaw and ethics 606 $2Jurisprudence & philosophy of law 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aConsent (Law) 615 0$aLaw and ethics. 676 $a340.112 700 $aBeyleveld$b Deryck$0617957 702 $aBrownsword$b Roger 801 0$bUtOrBLW 801 1$bUtOrBLW 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910458222203321 996 $aConsent in the law$92461820 997 $aUNINA