LEADER 04193nam 2200697Ia 450 001 9910457942803321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-8014-6336-X 010 $a0-8014-6335-1 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801463358 035 $a(CKB)2550000000063212 035 $a(OCoLC)760056432 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10508792 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000539194 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11324595 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000539194 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10568872 035 $a(PQKB)11296412 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001499049 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138266 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse28952 035 $a(DE-B1597)478438 035 $a(OCoLC)979577209 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801463358 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138266 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10508792 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL768213 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000063212 100 $a20110218d2011 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aMobilizing restraint$b[electronic resource] $edemocracy and industrial conflict in postreform South Asia /$fEmmanuel Teitelbaum 210 $aIthaca $cILR Press$d2011 215 $a1 online resource (241 p.) 225 0 $aCornell paperbacks 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-8014-7705-0 311 $a0-8014-4994-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tTables and Figures -- $tPreface -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tAbbreviations -- $t1. Introduction: The Political Management of Industrial Conflict -- $tPart I. A Puzzle and an Argument -- $tPart II. The Evidence -- $tAppendix A. Survey Methods and Response Rates -- $tAppendix B. Labor Law Coding -- $tNotes -- $tWorks Cited -- $tIndex 330 $aIn Mobilizing Restraint, Emmanuel Teitelbaum argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, democracies are better at managing industrial conflict than authoritarian regimes. This is because democracies have two unique tools at their disposal for managing worker protest: mutually beneficial union-party ties and worker rights. By contrast, authoritarian governments have tended to repress unions and to sever mutually beneficial ties to organized labor. Many of the countries that fall between these two extremes-from those that have only the trappings of democracy to those that have imperfectly implemented democratic reforms-exert control over labor in the absence of overt repression but without the robust organizational and institutional capacity enjoyed by full-fledged democracies. Based on the recent history of industrial conflict and industrial peace in South Asia, Teitelbaum argues that the political exclusion and repression of organized labor commonly witnessed in authoritarian and hybrid regimes has extremely deleterious effects on labor relations and ultimately economic growth.To test his arguments, Teitelbaum draws on an array of data, including his original qualitative interviews and survey evidence from Sri Lanka and three Indian states-Kerala, Maharashtra, and West Bengal. He also analyzes panel data from fifteen Indian states to evaluate the relationship between political competition and worker protest and to study the effects of protective labor legislation on economic performance. In Teitelbaum's view, countries must undergo further political liberalization before they are able to replicate the success of the sophisticated types of growth-enhancing management of industrial protest seen throughout many parts of South Asia. 410 0$aCornell paperbacks. 606 $aEmployee rights$zSouth Asia 606 $aLabor unions$zSouth Asia 606 $aConflict management$zSouth Asia 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aEmployee rights 615 0$aLabor unions 615 0$aConflict management 676 $a331.880954 700 $aTeitelbaum$b Emmanuel$f1974-$01026358 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910457942803321 996 $aMobilizing restraint$92441232 997 $aUNINA