LEADER 04544nam 2200697Ia 450 001 9910457790503321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-8014-6320-3 010 $a0-8014-6319-X 024 7 $a10.7591/9780801463198 035 $a(CKB)2550000000063358 035 $a(OCoLC)762097543 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10508779 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000564868 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11363524 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000564868 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10527081 035 $a(PQKB)11789297 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001499143 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3138254 035 $a(OCoLC)966821616 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse51948 035 $a(DE-B1597)478680 035 $a(OCoLC)979833664 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780801463198 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3138254 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10508779 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL681799 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000063358 100 $a20110324d2011 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe money laundry$b[electronic resource] $eregulating criminal finance in the global economy /$fJ.C. Sharman 210 $aIthaca [N.Y.] $cCornell University Press$d2011 215 $a1 online resource (214 p.) 225 1 $aCornell studies in political economy 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a1-322-50517-9 311 $a0-8014-5018-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tIntroduction: Policy Diffusion and Anti-Money Laundering -- $t1. Money Laundering and Anti-Money Laundering -- $tPart One. Does Anti-Money Laundering Policy Work? -- $t2. An Indirect Test of Effectiveness -- $t3. A Direct Test of Effectiveness -- $tPart Two. Why Has Anti-Money Laundering Policy Diffused? -- $t4. Blacklisting -- $t5. Socialization and Competition -- $tConclusions: Implications for Scholarship and Policy -- $tBibliography -- $tIndex 330 $aA generation ago not a single country had laws to counter money laundering; now, more countries have standardized anti-money laundering (AML) policies than have armed forces. In The Money Laundry, J. C. Sharman investigates whether AML policy works, and why it has spread so rapidly to so many states with so little in common. Sharman asserts that there are few benefits to such policies but high costs, which fall especially heavily on poor countries. Sharman tests the effectiveness of AML laws by soliciting offers for just the kind of untraceable shell companies that are expressly forbidden by global standards. In practice these are readily available, and the author had no difficulty in buying the services of such companies. After dealing with providers in countries ranging from the Seychelles and Somalia to the United States and Britain, Sharman demonstrates that it is easier to form untraceable companies in large rich states than in small poor ones; the United States is the worst offender.Despite its ineffectiveness, AML policy has spread via three paths. The Financial Action Task Force, the key standard-setter and enforcer in this area, has successfully implemented a strategy of blacklisting to promote compliance. Publicly identified as noncompliant, targeted states suffered damage to their reputation. Subsequently, officials from poor countries became socialized within transnational policy networks. Finally, international banks began using the presence of AML policy as a proxy for general country risk. Developing states have responded by adopting this policy as a functionally useless but symbolically valuable way of reassuring powerful outsiders. Since the financial crisis of 2008, the G20 has used the successful methods of coercive policy diffusion pioneered in the AML realm as a model for other global governance initiatives. 410 0$aCornell studies in political economy. 606 $aMoney laundering$xPrevention 606 $aBanks and banking, International$xLaw and legislation 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aMoney laundering$xPrevention. 615 0$aBanks and banking, International$xLaw and legislation. 676 $a364.16/8 686 $aPH 3960$2rvk 700 $aSharman$b J. C$g(Jason Campbell),$f1973-$01047345 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910457790503321 996 $aThe money laundry$92474856 997 $aUNINA