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181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
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200 10$aCommon sense $ea contemporary defense /$fNoah Lemos$b[electronic resource]
210  1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2004.
215   $a1 online resource (xvi, 192 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s)
225 1 $aCambridge studies in philosophy
300   $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
311   $a0-521-14345-4 
311   $a0-521-83784-7 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 183-185) and index.
327   $tThe common sense tradition --$tCommon sense and reliability --$tCommon sense and reliability II --$tReid, reliability, and Reid's wrong turn --$tMoore, skepticism, and the external world --$tChisholm, particularism, and methodism --$tCommon sense and a priori epistemology --$tParticularism, ethical skepticism, and moral philosophy.
330   $aIn this 2004 book, Noah Lemos presents a strong defense of the common sense tradition, the view that we may take as data for philosophical inquiry many of the things we ordinarily think we know. He discusses the main features of that tradition as expounded by Thomas Reid, G. E. Moore and Roderick Chisholm. For a long time common sense philosophers have been subject to two main objections: that they fail to give any non-circular argument for the reliability of memory and perception; and that they pick out instances of knowledge without knowing a criterion for knowledge. Lemos defends the appeal to what we ordinarily think we know in both epistemology and ethics and thus rejects the charge that common sense is dogmatic, unphilosophical or question-begging. Written in a clear and engaging style, this book will appeal to students and philosophers in epistemology and ethics.
410  0$aCambridge studies in philosophy.
606   $aCommon sense
615  0$aCommon sense.
676   $a149
700   $aLemos$b Noah Marcelino$f1956-$01050562
801  0$bUkCbUP
801  1$bUkCbUP
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