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101 0 $aeng
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181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 10$aPutting auction theory to work /$fPaul Milgrom$b[electronic resource]
210  1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2004.
215   $a1 online resource (xxii, 368 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s)
225 1 $aChurchill lectures in economics
300   $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
311   $a0-521-53672-3 
311   $a0-521-55184-6 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 339-346) and indexes.
327   $aGetting to work -- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms -- The envelope theorem and payoff equivalence -- Bidding equilibrium and revenue differences -- Interdependence of types and values -- Auctions in context -- Uniform price auctions -- Package auctions and combinatorial bidding.
330   $aThis book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
410  0$aChurchill lectures in economics.
606   $aAuctions$xMathematical models
606   $aAuction theory
615  0$aAuctions$xMathematical models.
615  0$aAuction theory.
676   $a381/.17/01
700   $aMilgrom$b Paul R$g(Paul Robert),$f1948-$0116237
801  0$bUkCbUP
801  1$bUkCbUP
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910457605403321
996   $aPutting auction theory to work$9263820
997   $aUNINA