LEADER 04496nam 2200793 a 450 001 9910457525103321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-4008-1611-4 010 $a1-4008-1429-4 010 $a1-283-38012-9 010 $a9786613380128 010 $a1-4008-2395-1 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400823956 035 $a(CKB)2550000000078994 035 $a(EBL)859835 035 $a(OCoLC)775873120 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000268906 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11218190 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000268906 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10237520 035 $a(PQKB)10569419 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC859835 035 $a(OCoLC)52256521 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse43239 035 $a(WaSeSS)Ind00071664 035 $a(DE-B1597)453622 035 $a(OCoLC)979834480 035 $a(OCoLC)984688333 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400823956 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL859835 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10522521 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL338012 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000078994 100 $a20000322d2000 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aWar and punishment$b[electronic resource] $ethe causes of war termination and the First World War /$fH.E. Goemans 205 $aCore Textbook 210 $aPrinceton, N.J. $cPrinceton University Press$dc2000 215 $a1 online resource (366 p.) 225 1 $aPrinceton studies in international history and politics 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-04943-2 311 $a0-691-04944-0 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [325]-350) and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tCONTENTS -- $tLIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES -- $tACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- $t1. INTRODUCTION -- $t2. A THEORY OF WAR TERMINATION -- $t3. LARGE N: THE FATE OF LEADERS AND THE DURATION OF WAR -- $t4. GERMANY -- $t5. RUSSIA -- $t6. FRANCE -- $t7. GREAT BRITAIN -- $t8. THE TERMINATION OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR, I: 1914-1917 -- $t9. THE TERMINATION OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR, II: 1918 -- $t10. CONCLUSION -- $tBIBLIOGRAPHY -- $tINDEX 330 $aWhat makes wars drag on and why do they end when they do? Here H. E. Goemans brings theoretical rigor and empirical depth to a long-standing question of securities studies. He explores how various government leaders assess the cost of war in terms of domestic politics and their own postwar fates. Goemans first develops the argument that two sides will wage war until both gain sufficient knowledge of the other's strengths and weaknesses so as to agree on the probable outcome of continued war. Yet the incentives that motivate leaders to then terminate war, Goemans maintains, can vary greatly depending on the type of government they represent. The author looks at democracies, dictatorships, and mixed regimes and compares the willingness among leaders to back out of wars or risk the costs of continued warfare. Democracies, according to Goemans, will prefer to withdraw quickly from a war they are not winning in order to appease the populace. Autocracies will do likewise so as not to be overthrown by their internal enemies. Mixed regimes, which are made up of several competing groups and which exclude a substantial proportion of the people from access to power, will likely see little risk in continuing a losing war in the hope of turning the tide. Goemans explores the conditions and the reasoning behind this "gamble for resurrection" as well as other strategies, using rational choice theory, statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Germany, Britain, France, and Russia during World War I. In so doing, he offers a new perspective of the Great War that integrates domestic politics, international politics, and battlefield developments. 410 0$aPrinceton studies in international history and politics. 606 $aPeace 606 $aWorld War, 1914-1918$xArmistices 606 $aPeace treaties 606 $aCapitulations, Military 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aPeace. 615 0$aWorld War, 1914-1918$xArmistices. 615 0$aPeace treaties. 615 0$aCapitulations, Military. 676 $a940.4/39 700 $aGoemans$b H. E$g(Hein Erich),$f1957-$01027642 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910457525103321 996 $aWar and punishment$92443211 997 $aUNINA