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100   $a20090422d2010      uy             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|n|---|||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 14$aThe calculus of selfishness$b[electronic resource] /$fKarl Sigmund
205   $aCourse Book
210   $aPrinceton, NJ $cPrinceton University Press$dc2010
215   $a1 online resource (185 p.)
225 1 $aPrinceton series in theoretical and computational biology
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311   $a0-691-17108-4 
311   $a0-691-14275-0 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $tFrontmatter --$tContents --$tPreface --$tChapter One. Introduction: Social Traps and Simple Games --$tChapter Two. Game Dynamics and Social Learning --$tChapter Three. Direct Reciprocity: The Role of Repetition --$tChapter Four. Indirect Reciprocity: The Role of Reputation --$tChapter Five. Fairness and Trust: The Power of Incentives --$tChapter Six. Public Goods and Joint Efforts: Between Freedom and Enforcement --$tChapter Seven. Cooperation in Structured Populations --$tReferences --$tIndex
330   $aHow does cooperation emerge among selfish individuals? When do people share resources, punish those they consider unfair, and engage in joint enterprises? These questions fascinate philosophers, biologists, and economists alike, for the "invisible hand" that should turn selfish efforts into public benefit is not always at work. The Calculus of Selfishness looks at social dilemmas where cooperative motivations are subverted and self-interest becomes self-defeating. Karl Sigmund, a pioneer in evolutionary game theory, uses simple and well-known game theory models to examine the foundations of collective action and the effects of reciprocity and reputation. Focusing on some of the best-known social and economic experiments, including games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Trust, Ultimatum, Snowdrift, and Public Good, Sigmund explores the conditions leading to cooperative strategies. His approach is based on evolutionary game dynamics, applied to deterministic and probabilistic models of economic interactions. Exploring basic strategic interactions among individuals guided by self-interest and caught in social traps, The Calculus of Selfishness analyzes to what extent one key facet of human nature--selfishness--can lead to cooperation.
410  0$aPrinceton series in theoretical and computational biology.
606   $aGame theory
606   $aCooperativeness$xMoral and ethical aspects
606   $aEvolution (Biology)$xMathematics
608   $aElectronic books.
615  0$aGame theory.
615  0$aCooperativeness$xMoral and ethical aspects.
615  0$aEvolution (Biology)$xMathematics.
676   $a306.3/4
700   $aSigmund$b Karl$f1945-$01045248
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910457130603321
996   $aThe calculus of selfishness$92471358
997   $aUNINA