LEADER 04091nam 2200661 450 001 9910456812203321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-4426-8985-4 024 7 $a10.3138/9781442689855 035 $a(CKB)2550000000019336 035 $a(OCoLC)632170388 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10382003 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000478733 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11291658 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000478733 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10435049 035 $a(PQKB)10730446 035 $a(CaPaEBR)431915 035 $a(CaBNvSL)slc00224353 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3268220 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4672721 035 $a(DE-B1597)465160 035 $a(OCoLC)1013956040 035 $a(OCoLC)954123578 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781442689855 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4672721 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11258376 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000019336 100 $a20160923h20092009 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aReason, truth, and reality /$fDan Goldstick 210 1$aToronto, [Ontario] ;$aBuffalo, [New York] ;$aLondon, [England] :$cUniversity of Toronto Press,$d2009. 210 4$dİ2009 215 $a1 online resource (348 p.) 300 $aIncludes index. 311 $a0-8020-9594-1 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tPreface -- $tPart One: Introductory -- $t1. Introduction -- $t2. On Moore's Paradox -- $t3. On Factuality -- $t4. On the Canons of Deductive Inference -- $t5. Preliminary Assault on the Philosophy of Empiricism -- $tPart Two: On the Canons of Induction -- $t6. Preliminary Considerations -- $t7. Sensationalism -- $t8. Naturalism -- $t9. Inductivism -- $t10. Pragmatism -- $t11. Nihilism, Scepticism, and Decisionism -- $t12. Possibility, Probability, Negation, and Change -- $t13. Causality and Impermanence -- $t14. Simplicity -- $t15. How to Reason Inductively -- $t16. The Case for Universal Impermanence -- $t17. That Determinism Is Incontrovertible -- $t18. The Pitfall of Metaphysics -- $tPart Three: On the Canons of Morality -- $t19. Preliminary Considerations -- $t20. Sensationalism -- $t21. Naturalism -- $t22. Inductivism -- $t23. Pragmatism -- $t24. Nihilism, Scepticism, and Decisionism -- $t25. Ethics and Induction -- $t26. Mores -- $t27. 'Consciencelessness' -- $t28. Utility -- $t29. Comparing Utilities -- $t30. Population -- $t31. 'Hypocrisy' Stipulatively Defined -- $t32. Utilitarianism Proved -- $t33. Conclusion: We Each Sit in Judgment -- $tAppendix 1: 'Tautology' -- $tAppendix 2: 'Desire' -- $tIndex 330 $aDan Goldstick's Reason, Truth, and Reality addresses two questions: what sort of world do we inhabit? and what moral obligations do we have? To answer the questions Goldstick mounts a bold contemporary defense of pre-Kantian rationalism. Basing consideration upon a characterization of reason in its deductive, inductive, and ethical functioning, he asks what must hold good for reason so characterized to be a dependable guide to truth. The conclusions Goldstick draws are threefold. First of all, the argument points to continuous deterministic causality throughout space and time. In the second place, a case is made for universal impermanence. And thirdly, Goldstick claims to establish a basis for the right within a version of utilitarianism supporting the maximum long-term promotion of people's interests. The discussion takes in such traditional rationalist themes as aprioricity, conceivability, and antiscepticism, and such analytic topics as belief-and-desire, truthvaluelessness, and epistemic reliability. 606 $aReason 606 $aRationalism 606 $aEthics 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aReason. 615 0$aRationalism. 615 0$aEthics. 676 $a128/.33 700 $aGoldstick$b D$g(Daniel),$f1940-$0967178 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910456812203321 996 $aReason, truth, and reality$92195668 997 $aUNINA