LEADER 04427nam 2200685 450 001 9910456689503321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-4008-5184-X 010 $a1-283-22746-0 010 $a9786613227461 010 $a1-4008-4022-8 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400851843 035 $a(CKB)2550000000045285 035 $a(EBL)744108 035 $a(OCoLC)756280837 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000544186 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11335562 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000544186 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10536209 035 $a(PQKB)10510925 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC744108 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001753259 035 $a(OCoLC)966771450 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse54662 035 $a(DE-B1597)459850 035 $a(OCoLC)984637849 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400851843 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000045285 100 $a20110128h20112011 uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|nu---|u||u 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aLocke on personal identity $econsciousness and concernment /$fGalen Strawson 205 $aUpdated edition with a New Preface 210 1$aPrinceton, New Jersey :$cPrinceton University Press,$d[2011] 210 4$dİ2011 215 $a1 online resource (278 p.) 225 1 $aPrinceton monographs in philosophy 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 0 $a0-691-16100-3 311 0 $a0-691-14757-4 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tPreface --$tChapter One. Introduction --$tChapter Two. "Person" --$tChapter Three. "Person . . . is a forensic term" --$tChapter Four. Concernment --$tChapter Five. Consciousness --$tChapter Six. "Consciousness . . . is inseparable from thinking" --$tChapter Seven. "From the inside" --$tChapter Eight. "Person"-Locke's Definition --$tChapter Nine. Consciousness Is Not Memory --$tChapter Ten. Personal Identity --$tChapter Eleven. Psychological Connectedness --$tChapter Twelve. Transition (Butler Dismissed) --$tChapter Thirteen. " But next . . . ": Personal Identity without Substantial Continuity --$tChapter Fourteen. "And therefore . . . ": [I]-transfers, [Ag]-transfers, [P]-transfers --$tChapter Fifteen. "A fatal error of theirs" --$tChapter Sixteen. A Fatal Error of Locke's? --$tChapter Seventeen. Circularity? --$tChapter Eighteen. The Distinction between [P] and [S] --$tChapter Nineteen. Concernment and Repentance --$tChapter Twenty. Conclusion --$tPostface --$tAppendix One. "Of Identity and Diversity" An Essay concerning Human Understanding /$rLocke, John --$tAppendix Two. A Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion Concerning Personal Identity /$rLaw, Edmund --$tReferences --$tIndex 330 $aJohn Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves-yet it is widely thought to be wrong. In this book, Galen Strawson argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. Strawson argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word "person" as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like "human being." In actuality, Locke uses "person" primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word "conscious." When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity. 410 0$aPrinceton monographs in philosophy. 606 $aIdentity (Psychology) 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aIdentity (Psychology) 676 $a126.092 700 $aStrawson$b Galen$0953504 701 $aStrawson$b Galen$0953504 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910456689503321 996 $aLocke on personal identity$92468348 997 $aUNINA