LEADER 03716nam 2200673Ia 450 001 9910456593303321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-282-45847-7 010 $a9786612458477 010 $a1-4008-3090-7 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400830909 035 $a(CKB)2550000000002659 035 $a(EBL)483508 035 $a(OCoLC)568049633 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000341091 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11243874 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000341091 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10389506 035 $a(PQKB)10892107 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC483508 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36560 035 $a(DE-B1597)446930 035 $a(OCoLC)979745137 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400830909 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL483508 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10364725 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL245847 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000002659 100 $a20090121d2009 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aOn myself, and other, less important subjects$b[electronic resource] /$fCaspar John Hare 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton, N.J. $cPrinceton University Press$dc2009 215 $a1 online resource (135 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-17803-8 311 $a0-691-13531-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $t Frontmatter -- $tContents -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tIntroduction -- $t1 Self- Interest and Self- Importance -- $t2 Time- Bias and the Metaphysics of Time -- $t3 Egocentrism and Egocentric Metaphysics -- $t4 Clarifications -- $t5 A Problem about Personal Identity over Time -- $t6 The Solution -- $t7 Skepticism and Humility -- $tNotes -- $tReferences -- $tIndex 330 $aCaspar Hare makes an original and compelling case for "egocentric presentism," a view about the nature of first-person experience, about what happens when we see things from our own particular point of view. A natural thought about our first-person experience is that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present to me." Hare, however, goes one step further and claims, counterintuitively, that the thought should instead be that "all and only the things of which I am aware are present." There is, in other words, something unique about me and the things of which I am aware. On Myself and Other, Less Important Subjects represents a new take on an old view, known as solipsism, which maintains that people's experiences give them grounds for believing that they have a special, distinguished place in the world--for example, believing that only they exist or that other people do not have conscious minds like their own. Few contemporary thinkers have taken solipsism seriously. But Hare maintains that the version of solipsism he argues for is in indeed defensible, and that it is uniquely capable of resolving some seemingly intractable philosophical problems--both in metaphysics and ethics--concerning personal identity over time, as well as the tension between self-interest and the greater good. This formidable and tightly argued defense of a seemingly absurd view is certain to provoke debate. 606 $aSelf (Philosophy) 606 $aSolipsism 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aSelf (Philosophy) 615 0$aSolipsism. 676 $a126 700 $aHare$b Caspar John$f1972-$01044166 701 $aJohnston$b Mark$01005715 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910456593303321 996 $aOn myself, and other, less important subjects$92469636 997 $aUNINA