LEADER 03635nam 2200661 450 001 9910456532303321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-4426-7974-3 024 7 $a10.3138/9781442679740 035 $a(CKB)2430000000001426 035 $a(EBL)4671943 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000377939 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11282094 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000377939 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10354742 035 $a(PQKB)10819026 035 $a(CaBNvSL)thg00600671 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3255402 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4671943 035 $a(DE-B1597)464853 035 $a(OCoLC)944177597 035 $a(OCoLC)999378663 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781442679740 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4671943 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr11257631 035 $a(OCoLC)288106319 035 $a(EXLCZ)992430000000001426 100 $a20160922h20002000 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aSemantic challenges to realism $eDummett and Putnam /$fMark Quentin Gardiner 210 1$aToronto, [Ontario] ;$aBuffalo, [New York] ;$aLondon, [England] :$cUniversity of Toronto Press,$d2000. 210 4$dİ2000 215 $a1 online resource (278 p.) 225 0 $aToronto Studies in Philosophy 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-8020-4771-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tPreface -- $tIntroduction -- $tPART I. Dummett's Semantic Anti-Realism -- $t1. Dummett's Constraints - Meaning and Metaphysics -- $t2. Dummett's Critique of Semantic Realism -- $t3. Responses to the Negative Program -- $t4. Responses to the Positive Program -- $tPART II. Putnam's Internal Realism -- $t5. Portraits: Metaphysical and Internal Realisms -- $t6. The Model-Theoretic Argument -- $t7. Brains in Vats -- $t8. The Argument from Equivalence -- $tConclusion -- $tNotes -- $tBibliography -- $tIndex 330 $aAnti-realism entered the philosophical scene some twenty years ago, and has since become a widely accepted view. But although many philosophers espouse anti-realism, the only sustained arguments for the position are due to Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam. Much discussion of their views has appeared in the journals, especially concerning some of Putnam's pithy and memorable expositions, like the 'Brain in the Vat'; however, this is the first book to provide a thorough examination and rebuttal of their arguments.Dummett's and Putnam's arguments are long, complex, and often technical. They have been developed over time, often in response to criticisms of earlier formulations or to the parallel but independent research of others, and accordingly, each of their premises gives rise to a host of issues, questions, and concerns. Mark Gardiner guides us through this difficult terrain, discussing the abundant literature on the subject along the way. With its compelling argument and accessible style, this thorough and authoritative study will provide an important contribution to the realism/anti-realism debate. 410 0$aToronto studies in philosophy 606 $aRealism 606 $aSemantics (Philosophy) 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aRealism. 615 0$aSemantics (Philosophy) 676 $a149/.2 700 $aGardiner$b Mark Q$g(Mark Quentin),$f1963-$01048535 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910456532303321 996 $aSemantic challenges to realism$92476889 997 $aUNINA