LEADER 04701nam 22006732 450 001 9910455876903321 005 20151005020621.0 010 $a1-107-12556-1 010 $a0-521-03754-9 010 $a0-511-14772-4 010 $a0-511-30498-6 010 $a0-511-49848-9 010 $a1-280-42150-9 010 $a0-511-04535-2 010 $a0-511-17739-9 010 $a9786610421503 035 $a(CKB)111087027158424 035 $a(EBL)202221 035 $a(OCoLC)52733624 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000181997 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11169816 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000181997 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10166800 035 $a(PQKB)11723657 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511498480 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC202221 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL202221 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10019085 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL42150 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111087027158424 100 $a20090309d2002|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aInterpreting probability $econtroversies and developments in the early twentieth century /$fDavid Howie$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2002. 215 $a1 online resource (xi, 262 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aCambridge studies in probability, induction and decision theory 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a0-521-81251-8 311 $a0-511-01661-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 239-251) and index. 327 $tThe meaning of probability --$tThe history of probability --$tScope of this book --$tMethods and argument --$tSynopsis and aims --$tProbability up to the Twentieth Century --$tEarly applications of the probability calculus --$tResistance to the calculation of uncertainty --$tThe doctrine of chances --$tInverse probability --$tLaplacean probability --$tThe eclipse of Laplacean probability --$tSocial statistics --$tThe rise of the frequency interpretation of probability --$tOpposition to social statistics and probabilistic methods --$tProbability theory in the sciences: evolution and biometrics --$tThe interpretation of probability around the end of the nineteenth century --$tR.A. Fisher and Statistical Probability --$tR.A. Fisher's early years --$tEvolution -- the biometricians versus the Mendelians --$tFisher's early work --$tThe clash with Pearson --$tFisher's rejection of inverse probability --$tFisher's new version of probability --$tThe papers of 1921 and 1922 --$tThe Pearson-Fisher feud --$tThe move to Rothamsted: experimental design --$tThe position in 1925 -- Statistical Methods for Research Workers --$tThe development of fiducial probability --$tFisher's position in 1932 --$tHarold Jeffreys and Inverse Probability --$tJeffreys's background and early career --$tThe Meteorological Office --$tDorothy Wrinch --$tBroad's 1918 paper --$tWrinch and Jeffreys tackle probability --$tAfter the first paper --$tGeneral relativity --$tThe Oppau explosion --$tNew work on probability -- John Maynard Keynes --$tOther factors --$tProbability theory extended. 330 $aThe term probability can be used in two main senses. In the frequency interpretation it is a limiting ratio in a sequence of repeatable events. In the Bayesian view, probability is a mental construct representing uncertainty. This 2002 book is about these two types of probability and investigates how, despite being adopted by scientists and statisticians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Bayesianism was discredited as a theory of scientific inference during the 1920s and 1930s. Through the examination of a dispute between two British scientists, the author argues that a choice between the two interpretations is not forced by pure logic or the mathematics of the situation, but depends on the experiences and aims of the individuals involved. The book should be of interest to students and scientists interested in statistics and probability theories and to general readers with an interest in the history, sociology and philosophy of science. 410 0$aCambridge studies in probability, induction, and decision theory. 606 $aProbabilities 606 $aBayesian statistical decision theory 615 0$aProbabilities. 615 0$aBayesian statistical decision theory. 676 $a519.5/42 700 $aHowie$b David$f1970-$0281062 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910455876903321 996 $aInterpreting probability$9671724 997 $aUNINA