LEADER 04836nam 2200721Ia 450 001 9910455602803321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-282-53769-5 010 $a9786612537691 010 $a0-226-70387-8 024 7 $a10.7208/9780226703879 035 $a(CKB)2520000000006486 035 $a(EBL)496608 035 $a(OCoLC)593356272 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000340254 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12069928 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000340254 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10365212 035 $a(PQKB)10977945 035 $a(StDuBDS)EDZ0000122539 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC496608 035 $a(DE-B1597)524394 035 $a(OCoLC)1135592727 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780226703879 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL496608 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10372079 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL253769 035 $a(EXLCZ)992520000000006486 100 $a20020523d2003 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aMeasuring judicial independence$b[electronic resource] $ethe political economy of judging in Japan /$fJ. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen 210 $aChicago, IL $cUniversity of Chicago Press$d2003 215 $a1 online resource (215 p.) 225 1 $aStudies in law and economics 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-226-70388-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 187-196) and index. 327 $tFrontmatter -- $tContents -- $tPreface -- $tAcknowledgments -- $tIntroduction: 1968 -- $t1. The Setting -- $t2. Preliminary Empirics: Methodology and Communist Judges -- $t3. The Effect of Judicial Decisions: Anti-Government Opinions and Electoral Law Disputes -- $t4. Political Disputes: Military, Malapportionment, Injunctions, and Constitutional Law -- $t5. Administrative Disputes: Taxpayers against the Government -- $t6. Criminal Cases: Suspects against the Government -- $t7. Toward a Party-Alternation Theory of Comparative Judicial Independence -- $t8. Conclusions -- $tAppendix A. Excerpts from the Constitutional Texts -- $tAppendix B. Data Used for Time2Sok Estimates in Tables 2.5-2.7 -- $tAppendix C. Interpreting Ordered Probit Results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 -- $tAppendix D. A Formal Model of Prosecutorial Incentives -- $tReferences -- $tIndex 330 $aThe role of the U.S. Supreme Court in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election raised questions in the minds of many Americans about the relationships between judges and political influence; the following years saw equally heated debates over the appropriate role of political ideology in selecting federal judges. Legal scholars have always debated these questions-asking, in effect, how much judicial systems operate on merit and principle and how much they are shaped by politics. The Japanese Constitution, like many others, requires that all judges be "independent in the exercise of their conscience and bound only by this Constitution and its laws." Consistent with this requirement, Japanese courts have long enjoyed a reputation for vigilant independence-an idea challenged only occasionally, and most often anecdotally. But in this book, J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen use the latest statistical techniques to examine whether that reputation always holds up to scrutiny-whether, and to what extent, the careers of lower court judges can be manipulated to political advantage. On the basis of careful econometric analysis of career data for hundreds of judges, Ramseyer and Rasmusen find that Japanese politics do influence judicial careers, discreetly and indirectly: judges who decide politically charged cases in ways favored by the ruling party enjoy better careers after their decisions than might otherwise be expected, while dissenting judges are more likely to find their careers hampered by assignments to less desirable positions. Ramseyer and Rasmusen's sophisticated yet accessible analysis has much to offer anyone interested in either judicial independence or the application of econometric techniques in the social sciences. 410 0$aStudies in law and economics (Chicago, Ill.) 606 $aJudges$zJapan 606 $aJudicial process$zJapan 606 $aPolitical questions and judicial power$zJapan 606 $aCourts$zJapan 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aJudges 615 0$aJudicial process 615 0$aPolitical questions and judicial power 615 0$aCourts 676 $a347.52/014 700 $aRamseyer$b J. Mark$f1954-$0254543 701 $aRasmusen$b Eric$088925 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910455602803321 996 $aMeasuring judicial independence$92014802 997 $aUNINA