LEADER 01101nam0 22003133i 450 001 CAG0032485 005 20170908093238.0 100 $a20120505d1910 ||||0itac50 ba 101 | $afre 102 $afr 181 1$6z01$ai $bxxxe 182 1$6z01$an 200 1 $a˜Le œrêve$fEmile Zola$gillustrations de René Lelong 210 $aParis$cLafitte & C.ie$dc1910 215 $a121 p.$cill.$d25 cm. 225 | $aIdéal Bibliothèque 410 0$1001RAV0153102$12001 $aIdéal Bibliothèque 500 10$a˜Le œrêve$3LO10092720$9CFIV006123$991745 700 1$aZola$b, Émile$3CFIV006123$4070$0377373 702 1$aLelong$b, Rene$3RAVV062306$4440 790 1$aZola$b, Emil$3CFIV226994$zZola, Émile 790 1$aZola$b, Emilio$3SBNV027287$zZola, Émile 801 3$aIT$bIT-NA0079$c20120505 850 $aIT-SA0088 912 $aCAG0032485 950 0$aBiblioteca Statale Del Monumento Nazionale Della Abbazia Benedettina$d 95E 364-8-29$e 95 0000745695 B 1 v.$fZ $h20040415$i20120505 977 $a 95 996 $aRêve$991745 997 $aUNISANNIO LEADER 03531nam 22006134a 450 001 9910455284703321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-262-28058-2 010 $a0-585-29647-2 035 $a(CKB)111004366633158 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000227713 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11202674 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000227713 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10270368 035 $a(PQKB)11399869 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3338433 035 $a(OCoLC)939263558 035 $a(OCoLC-P)939263558 035 $a(MaCbMITP)5579 035 $a(PPN)055440541 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3338433 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr2001030 035 $a(EXLCZ)99111004366633158 100 $a19991008d1999 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aPrivatization, restructuring, and regulation of network utilities$b[electronic resource] /$fDavid M. Newbery 210 $aCambridge, Mass. $cMIT Press$dc1999 215 $axvi, 466 p. $cill 225 1 $aThe Walras-Pareto lectures ;$v2 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-262-14068-3 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [439]-452) and index. 330 $aNetwork utilities, such as electricity, telephones, and gas, are public utilities that require a fixed network to deliver their services. Because consumers have no choice of network, they risk exploitation by network owners. Once invested, however, a network's capital is sunk, and the bargaining advantage shifts from investor to consumer. The investor, fearing expropriation, may be reluctant to invest. The tension between consumer and investor can be side-stepped by state ownership. Alternatively, private ownership and consumers' political power can be reconciled through regulation. Either way, network utilities operate under terms set by the state. David Newbery argues that price-setting rules comprise only part of the policy agenda. Network utilities pose special problems of ownership and regulation. He discusses the history of ownership and regulation, privatization, and theories of regulation. Examining three network utilities in detail--telecoms, electricity, and gas--he contrasts the regulatory approaches of Britain and the United States. He also looks at liberalization in a variety of other countries. History shows that the mature forms of regulatory institutions are emarkably similar under both public and private ownership. This raises obvious questions such as: Will the forces that caused convergence to regulated vertical integration in the past reassert themselves? Can the benefits of competition be protected against the pressure to reintegrate? Will different utilities differ in their form and structure? A full understanding of the forces shaping regulatory institutions is necessary to answer these important questions. 410 0$aWalras-Pareto lectures ;$v2. 606 $aPublic utilities 606 $aPrivatization 606 $aPublic utilities$xGovernment policy 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aPublic utilities. 615 0$aPrivatization. 615 0$aPublic utilities$xGovernment policy. 676 $a363.6 700 $aNewbery$b David M. G$0118518 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910455284703321 996 $aPrivatization, restructuring, and regulation of network utilities$944518 997 $aUNINA