LEADER 04567nam 2200649Ia 450 001 9910455198403321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a0-674-26263-8 010 $a0-674-02945-3 024 7 $a10.4159/9780674029453 035 $a(CKB)1000000000805651 035 $a(StDuBDS)AH23050633 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000486150 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11325640 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000486150 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10430132 035 $a(PQKB)11612851 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3300758 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3300758 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10331345 035 $a(OCoLC)923116453 035 $a(DE-B1597)574616 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780674029453 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000805651 100 $a19950609d1995 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 14$aThe new sovereignty$b[electronic resource] $ecompliance with international regulatory agreements /$fAbram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes 210 $aCambridge, MA $cHarvard University Press$d1995 215 $a1 online resource (432p.) 300 $aOriginally published: 1995. 311 $a0-674-61782-7 311 $a0-674-61783-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [303]-404) and index. 327 $aPreface A Theory of Compliance Sanctions Treaty-Based Military and Economic Sanctions Membership Sanctions Unilateral Sanctions Toward a Strategy for Managing Compliance Norms Transparency, Norms, and Strategic Interaction Reporting and Data Collection Verification and Monitoring Instruments of Active Management Policy Review and Assessment Nongovernmental Organizations Revitalizing International Organizations Appendix: List of Treaties Notes Index 330 $aIn an increasingly interdependent world, states resort to an array of regulatory agreements to deal with global problems, using military or economic sanctions to achieve compliance. This book argues against such a model of treaty compliance. 330 $bIn an increasingly complex and interdependent world, states resort to a bewildering array of regulatory agreements to deal with problems as disparate as climate change, nuclear proliferation, international trade, satellite communications, species destruction, and intellectual property. In such a system, there must be some means of ensuring reasonably reliable performance of treaty obligations. The standard approach to this problem, by academics and politicians alike, is a search for treaties with "teeth"--military or economic sanctions to deter and punish violation. The New Sovereignty argues that this approach is misconceived. Cases of coercive enforcement are rare, and sanctions are too costly and difficult to mobilize to be a reliable enforcement tool. As an alternative to this "enforcement" model, the authors propose a "managerial" model of treaty compliance. It relies on the elaboration and application of treaty norms in a continuing dialogue between the parties--international officials and nongovernmental organizations--that generates pressure to resolve problems of noncompliance. In the process, the norms and practices of the regime themselves evolve and develop. The authors take a broad look at treaties in many different areas: arms control, human rights, labor, the environment, monetary policy, and trade. The extraordinary wealth of examples includes the Iran airbus shootdown, Libya's suit against Great Britain and the United States in the Lockerbie case, the war in Bosnia, and Iraq after the Gulf War. The authors conclude that sovereignty--the status of a recognized actor in the international system--requires membership in good standing in the organizations and regimes through which the world manages its common affairs. This requirement turns out to be the major pressure for compliance with treaty obligations. This book will be an invaluable resource and casebook for scholars, policymakers, international public servants, lawyers, and corporate executives. 606 $aTreaties 606 $aCompliance 606 $aSovereignty 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aTreaties. 615 0$aCompliance. 615 0$aSovereignty. 676 $a341.37 700 $aChayes$b Abram$f1922-2000.$0236745 701 $aChayes$b Antonia Handler$f1929-$0609220 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910455198403321 996 $aThe new sovereignty$92452863 997 $aUNINA