LEADER 03618nam 2200685 a 450 001 9910455173003321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-282-08847-5 010 $a9786612088476 010 $a0-300-14265-X 024 7 $a10.12987/9780300142655 035 $a(CKB)1000000000764766 035 $a(EBL)3420425 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000107346 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11142923 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000107346 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10015492 035 $a(PQKB)10671855 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3420425 035 $a(DE-B1597)484861 035 $a(OCoLC)567973929 035 $a(DE-B1597)9780300142655 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3420425 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10315685 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL208847 035 $a(OCoLC)923593754 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000764766 100 $a20071129d2008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe atomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War$b[electronic resource] /$fCampbell Craig, Sergey Radchenko 210 $aNew Haven $cYale University Press$dc2008 215 $a1 online resource (xxv, 201 pages) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-300-11028-6 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 171-195) and index. 327 $aFranklin Delano Roosevelt and atomic wartime diplomacy -- The great game -- Truman, the bomb, and the end of World War II -- Responding to Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- The Baruch Plan and the onset of American Cold War -- Stalin and the burial of international control. 330 $aAfter a devastating world war, culminating in the obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was clear that the United States and the Soviet Union had to establish a cooperative order if the planet was to escape an atomic World War III. In this provocative study, Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko show how the atomic bomb pushed the United States and the Soviet Union not toward cooperation but toward deep bipolar confrontation. Joseph Stalin, sure that the Americans meant to deploy their new weapon against Russia and defeat socialism, would stop at nothing to build his own bomb. Harry Truman, initially willing to consider cooperation, discovered that its pursuit would mean political suicide, especially when news of Soviet atomic spies reached the public. Both superpowers, moreover, discerned a new reality of the atomic age: now, cooperation must be total. The dangers posed by the bomb meant that intermediate measures of international cooperation would protect no one. Yet no two nations in history were less prepared to pursue total cooperation than were the United States and the Soviet Union. The logic of the bomb pointed them toward immediate Cold War. 606 $aCold War 606 $aAtomic bomb$xPolitical aspects 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$zSoviet Union 607 $aSoviet Union$xForeign relations$zUnited States 607 $aUnited States$xForeign relations$y1945-1953 607 $aSoviet Union$xForeign relations$y1945-1991 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aCold War. 615 0$aAtomic bomb$xPolitical aspects. 676 $a909.82/5 700 $aCraig$b Campbell$f1964-$0473415 701 $aRadchenko$b Sergey$0505649 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910455173003321 996 $aAtomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War$9804845 997 $aUNINA