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181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
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200 10$aDomain conditions in social choice theory /$fWulf Gaertner$b[electronic resource]
210  1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2001.
215   $a1 online resource (ix, 153 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s)
300   $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
311   $a0-521-02874-4 
311   $a0-511-01623-9 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 131-145) and index.
327   $g1.$tIntroduction --$g2.$tNotation, definitions, and two fundamental theorems --$g3.$tThe existence of collective choice rules under exclusion conditions for finite sets of discrete alternatives --$g4.$tArrovian social welfare functions, nonmanipulable voting procedures and stable group decision functions --$g5.$tRestrictions on the distribution of individuals' preferences --$g6.$tThe existence of social choice rules in n-dimensional continuous space --$g7.$tConcluding remarks.
330   $aWulf Gaertner provides a comprehensive account of an important and complex issue within social choice theory: how to establish a social welfare function while restricting the spectrum of individual preferences in a sensible way. Gaertner's starting point is K. J. Arrow's famous 'Impossibility Theorem', which showed that no welfare function could exist if an unrestricted domain of preferences is to be satisfied together with some other appealing conditions. A number of leading economists have tried to provide avenues out of this 'impossibility' by restricting the variety of preferences: here, Gaertner provides a clear and detailed account, using standardized mathematical notation, of well over forty theorems associated with domain conditions. Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory will be an essential addition to the library of social choice theory for scholars and their advanced graduate students.
606   $aSocial choice$xMathematical models
606   $aDecision making$xMathematical models
615  0$aSocial choice$xMathematical models.
615  0$aDecision making$xMathematical models.
676   $a302/.13
700   $aGaertner$b Wulf$0121855
801  0$bUkCbUP
801  1$bUkCbUP
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910455064703321
996   $aDomain conditions in social choice theory$9709446
997   $aUNINA