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200 14$aThe bounds of agency$b[electronic resource] $ean essay in revisionary metaphysics /$fCarol Rovane
205   $aCourse Book
210   $aPrinceton, N.J. $cPrinceton University Press$dc1998
215   $a1 online resource (271 p.)
225 0 $aPrinceton Legacy Library ;$v5567
300   $aDescription based upon print version of record.
311 0 $a0-691-65505-7 
311 0 $a0-691-01716-6 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [251]-254) and index.
327   $tFront matter --$tCONTENTS --$tACKNOWLEDGMENTS --$tPART I: LESSONS FROMLOCKE Introduction to Part I --$tIntroduction to Part I --$tCHAPTER ONE. Preview of the Normative Analysis of Personal Identity --$tCHAPTER TWO. On the Need for Revision --$tCHAPTER THREE. A Revisionary Proposal --$tPART II: PERSONAL IDENTITY: THE BODY PRACTIC --$tIntroduction to Part II --$tCHAPTER FOUR. A Sufficient Condition for Personal Identity --$tCHAPTER FIVE. The Sufficient Condition Is Also Necessary --$tCHAPTER SIX. The First Person --$tPOSTSCRIPT --$tBIBLIOGRAPHY --$tINDEX
330   $aThe subject of personal identity is one of the most central and most contested and exciting in philosophy. Ever since Locke, psychological and bodily criteria have vied with one another in conflicting accounts of personal identity. Carol Rovane argues that, as things stand, the debate is unresolvable since both sides hold coherent positions that our common sense will embrace. Our very common sense, she maintains, is conflicted; so any resolution to the debate is bound to be revisionary. She boldly offers such a revisionary theory of personal identity by first inquiring into the nature of persons.Rovane begins with a premise about the distinctive ethical nature of persons to which all substantive ethical doctrines, ranging from Kantian to egoist, can subscribe. From this starting point, she derives two startling metaphysical possibilities: there could be group persons composed of many human beings and multiple persons within a single human being. Her conclusion supports Locke's distinction between persons and human beings, but on altogether new grounds. These grounds lie in her radically normative analysis of the condition of personal identity, as the condition in which a certain normative commitment arises, namely, the commitment to achieve overall rational unity within a rational point of view. It is by virtue of this normative commitment that individual agents can engage one another specifically as persons, and possess the distinctive ethical status of persons.
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700   $aRovane$b Carol A$g(Carol Anne),$f1955-$01038163
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996   $aThe bounds of agency$92468335
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