LEADER 04194nam 2200685Ia 450 001 9910454936203321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-282-45670-9 010 $a9786612456701 010 $a3-11-021229-3 024 7 $a10.1515/9783110212297 035 $a(CKB)1000000000820826 035 $a(EBL)476070 035 $a(OCoLC)609852887 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000364817 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11290344 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000364817 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10419475 035 $a(PQKB)11495980 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC476070 035 $a(DE-B1597)35618 035 $a(OCoLC)647843548 035 $a(OCoLC)775645324 035 $a(DE-B1597)9783110212297 035 $a(PPN)175571295$9sudoc 035 $a(PPN)151752567 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL476070 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10359381 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL245670 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000820826 100 $a20091106d2009 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aProlepsis and Ennoia in the early Stoa$b[electronic resource] /$fHenry Dyson 210 $aBerlin ;$aNew York $cWalter de Gruyter$d2009 215 $a1 online resource (300 p.) 225 0 $aSozomena studies in the recovery of ancient texts ;$vv. 5 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a3-11-021228-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $t Frontmatter -- $tContents -- $tIntroduction: The Seeds of Virtue and Knowledge -- $tChapter One: Are Porlepses and Common Conceptions Identical? -- $tChapter Two: Prolepsis and Common Conceptions as Criteria of Truth -- $tChapter Three: Stages in the Development of Reason -- $tInterim Conclusions: Meno's Paradox and the Early Stoa -- $tChapter Four: The Formation of Prolepses -- $tChapter Five: Prolepsis in Ordinary and Philosophical Cognition -- $tConclusion: Are the Stoics Empiricists or Rationalists? -- $tTables: The Usage of ????????, ????????, and Related Terms -- $tAppendix A: Epicurus and Later Epicureans -- $tAppendix B: The Early Stoa -- $tAppendix C: Cicero and Seneca -- $tAppendix D: Epictetus -- $tAppendix E: Plutarch -- $tAppendix F: Sextus Empiricus -- $tAppendix G: Alexander of Aphrodisias -- $tAppendix H: Alcinous -- $t Backmatter 330 $aThis book reconstructs the Stoic doctrine of prolepsis. Prolepses are conceptions that develop naturally from ordinary experience. They are often identified with preconceptions (i.e. the first conceptions one unconsciously forms of something). However, this is inconsistent with the Stoics' claim that prolepseis are criteria of truth. Rather, prolepseis are analytically true claims embedded within one's ordinary conceptual scheme (e.g. the good is beneficial). When they have been articulated and systematized, prolepseis can be used to judge conceptual claims that go beyond the scope of sense-perceptual knowledge (e.g. pleasure is the good). The Stoics often refer to prolepseis as "common conceptions" to emphasize that they are shared by everyone, although in most people they remain unarticulated. This reconstruction suggests that Chrysippus was influenced by Platonic recollection to a greater extent than previously recognized. It supports the orthodoxy of Epictetus' statements about prolepsis and suggests that later authors who assimilate the Epicurean and Stoic doctrines were misled by the polemical attacks of Carneades. The argument of the book is supported by a comprehensive collection of fragments relating to prolepsis in Epicurus, the early Stoa, Cicero, Epictetus, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and Alexander of Aphrodisias. 410 0$aSozomena 606 $aStoics 606 $aPhilosophy, Ancient 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aStoics. 615 0$aPhilosophy, Ancient. 676 $a188 700 $aDyson$b Henry$f1975-$01030000 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910454936203321 996 $aProlepsis and Ennoia in the early Stoa$92446700 997 $aUNINA