LEADER 02344nam  2200589Ia 450 
001 9910454713403321
005 20200520144314.0
010   $a1-281-98921-5
010   $a9786611989217
010   $a0-19-152008-X
035   $a(CKB)1000000000756401
035   $a(StDuBDS)AH24079639
035   $a(SSID)ssj0000192526
035   $a(PQKBManifestationID)12023430
035   $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000192526
035   $a(PQKBWorkID)10216938
035   $a(PQKB)10559652
035   $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3053096
035   $a(Au-PeEL)EBL3053096
035   $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10283335
035   $a(CaONFJC)MIL198921
035   $a(OCoLC)922954023
035   $a(EXLCZ)991000000000756401
100   $a19890413d1989      uy             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aur|||||||||||
181   $ctxt
182   $cc
183   $acr
200 14$aThe limits of morality$b[electronic resource] /$fShelly Kagan
210   $aOxford $cClarendon Press ;$aNew York $cOxford University Press$dc1989
215   $a1 online resource (xii,415p.) 
225 1 $aOxford ethics series
300   $aIncludes index.
311   $a0-19-824913-6 
320   $aBibliography: p. [405]-407.
330   $bThis book, which is part of a series on moral philosophy, questions whether there are limits to the sacrifices that morality can demand of us.;The author contends that generally we do not think that we are morally required to make our greatest possible contributions to the overall good; rather, morality permits us to pursue our own personal goals and interests.;He also examines a second widely-held view that certain types of acts are simply forbidden even when necessary for promoting the overall good. The attempt to defend this second form of moral limit is also rejected as inadequate.;In thus rejecting two of the most fundamental features of common-sense morality, the author offers a sustained attack on our ordinary moral views.
410  0$aOxford ethics series.
606   $aEthics
606   $aValues
608   $aElectronic books.
615  0$aEthics.
615  0$aValues.
676   $a170
700   $aKagan$b Shelly$0775594
801  0$bMiAaPQ
801  1$bMiAaPQ
801  2$bMiAaPQ
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910454713403321
996   $aLimits of morality$91704800
997   $aUNINA