LEADER 03707nam 2200625Ia 450 001 9910454624503321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a3-8349-8127-3 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-8349-8127-1 035 $a(CKB)1000000000714763 035 $a(EBL)748591 035 $a(OCoLC)317883286 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000630941 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11370095 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000630941 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10591732 035 $a(PQKB)10021190 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-8349-8127-1 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC748591 035 $a(PPN)132864401 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL748591 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10279627 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL201843 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000714763 100 $a20090213d2008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aPrecaution incentives in accident settings$b[electronic resource] /$fby Tim Friehe 205 $a1st ed. 2008. 210 $aWiesbaden $cGabler$d2008 215 $a1 online resource (199 p.) 225 1 $aGabler Edition Wissenschaft. O?konomische Analyse des Rechts 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a3-8349-1292-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aThe Economics of Tort Law:Basics and Selected Core Themes -- On the Incentive Effects of Damage Averaging in Tort Law -- On the Superiority of Damage Averaging in the Case of Strict Liability -- Screening Accident Victims -- A Note on Judgment Proofness and Risk Aversion -- On the Similarity of Bilateral Harm and Unilateral Harm with Role-Type Uncertainty -- On Avoidance Activities After Accidents -- Conclusion. 330 $aOne central function of tort law is the inducement of precaution incentives. This is particularly welcome in settings in which the internalization of interdependencies between individuals relating to care and expected harm would otherwise not take effect due to high transaction costs broadly conceived, accident settings being a prime example. Tim Friehe analyzes important aspects for the design of tort law which intends to induce optimal individual choices and possible limitations of workable tort law in varied settings. Incentives to take precaution, which affect the accident probability and/or the magnitude of the harm in the event of an accident, are of primary interest in this context. After providing an extensive review of the literature relating to the economic analysis of tort law, the author goes on to discuss the consequences of victims with different harm levels. In particular, using average harm as a compensation measure in order to save administrative costs is considered and a scheme to make the revelation of the individual harm level incentive-compatible is devised. Furthermore, the book contributes to the ongoing discussion on the effects of judgment proofness and the distinction between unilateral harm and bilateral harm accidents. Finally, the author highlights the consequences of the consideration of hitherto neglected behavioral dimensions for the conclusions of the economic analysis of tort law. 410 0$aGabler Edition Wissenschaft.$pO?konomische Analyse des Rechts. 606 $aLaw and economics 606 $aAccident law 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aLaw and economics. 615 0$aAccident law. 676 $a340.115 700 $aFriehe$b Tim$0894596 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910454624503321 996 $aPrecaution incentives in accident settings$91998478 997 $aUNINA