LEADER 03922nam 22007092 450 001 9910454534903321 005 20151005020622.0 010 $a1-107-19454-7 010 $a0-511-69919-0 010 $a0-521-74438-5 010 $a0-511-65161-9 010 $a0-511-59378-3 010 $a0-511-59285-X 010 $a0-511-59571-9 035 $a(CKB)1000000000784254 035 $a(EBL)452012 035 $a(OCoLC)609843076 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000336985 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11283181 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000336985 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10283898 035 $a(PQKB)11501088 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511609954 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC452012 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL452012 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10329772 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL239358 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000784254 100 $a20090910d2009|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aEconomic crises and the breakdown of authoritarian regimes $eIndonesia and Malaysia in comparative perspective /$fThomas B. Pepinsky$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2009. 215 $a1 online resource (xviii, 326 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a0-511-60995-7 311 $a0-521-76793-8 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aCrises, adjustment, and transitions -- Coalitional sources of adjustment and regime survival -- Authoritarian support coalitions : comparing Indonesia and Malaysia -- Adjustment policy in Indonesia, June 1997-May 1998 -- Adjustment policy in Malaysia, June 1997-December 1999 -- Authoritarian breakdown in Indonesia -- Authoritarian stability in Malaysia -- Cross-national perspectives -- Conclusions. 330 $aWhy do some authoritarian regimes topple during financial crises, while others steer through financial crises relatively unscathed? In this book, Thomas B. Pepinsky uses the experiences of Indonesia and Malaysia and the analytical tools of open economy macroeconomics to answer this question. Focusing on the economic interests of authoritarian regimes' supporters, Pepinsky shows that differences in cross-border asset specificity produce dramatically different outcomes in regimes facing financial crises. When asset specificity divides supporters, as in Indonesia, they desire mutually incompatible adjustment policies, yielding incoherent adjustment policy followed by regime collapse. When coalitions are not divided by asset specificity, as in Malaysia, regimes adopt radical adjustment measures that enable them to survive financial crises. Combining rich qualitative evidence from Southeast Asia with cross-national time-series data and comparative case studies of Latin American autocracies, Pepinsky reveals the power of coalitions and capital mobility to explain how financial crises produce regime change. 517 3 $aEconomic Crises & the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes 606 $aAuthoritarianism$zIndonesia 606 $aAuthoritarianism$zMalaysia 607 $aIndonesia$xPolitics and government$y20th century 607 $aIndonesia$xEconomic policy 607 $aIndonesia$xEconomic conditions$y20th century 607 $aMalaysia$xPolitics and government$y20th century 607 $aMalaysia$xEconomic policy 607 $aMalaysia$xEconomic conditions$y20th century 615 0$aAuthoritarianism 615 0$aAuthoritarianism 676 $a959.505/4 700 $aPepinsky$b Thomas B.$f1979-$0853611 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910454534903321 996 $aEconomic crises and the breakdown of authoritarian regimes$91905952 997 $aUNINA