LEADER 03472nam 22006852 450 001 9910454439303321 005 20151005020622.0 010 $a1-107-19950-6 010 $a0-511-73688-6 010 $a1-281-98248-2 010 $a9786611982485 010 $a0-511-46432-0 010 $a0-511-55198-3 010 $a0-511-46506-8 010 $a0-511-46274-3 010 $a0-511-46199-2 010 $a0-511-46353-7 035 $a(CKB)1000000000693044 035 $a(EBL)410123 035 $a(OCoLC)437089339 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000216751 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11173189 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000216751 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10197812 035 $a(PQKB)11647821 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9780511551987 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC410123 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL410123 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10275341 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL198248 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000693044 100 $a20090512d2008|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 14$aThe Ottoman road to war in 1914 $ethe Ottoman Empire and the First World War /$fMustafa Aksakal$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2008. 215 $a1 online resource (xv, 216 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aCambridge military histories 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a0-521-17525-9 311 $a0-521-88060-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 195-207) and index. 327 $aPursuing sovereignty in the age of imperialism -- The intellectual and emotional climate after the Balkan Wars -- 1914 : war with Greece? -- The Ottomans within the international order -- The great war as great opportunity : the Ottoman July crisis -- Tug of war : Penelope's game -- Salvation through war? -- Conclusion : the decision for war remembered. 330 $aWhy did the Ottoman Empire enter the First World War in late October 1914, months after the war's devastations had become clear? Were its leaders 'simple-minded,' 'below-average' individuals, as the doyen of Turkish diplomatic history has argued? Or, as others have claimed, did the Ottomans enter the war because War Minister Enver Pasha, dictating Ottoman decisions, was in thrall to the Germans and to his own expansionist dreams? Based on previously untapped Ottoman and European sources, Mustafa Aksakal's dramatic study challenges this consensus. It demonstrates that responsibility went far beyond Enver, that the road to war was paved by the demands of a politically interested public, and that the Ottoman leadership sought the German alliance as the only way out of a web of international threats and domestic insecurities, opting for an escape whose catastrophic consequences for the empire and seismic impact on the Middle East are felt even today. 410 0$aCambridge military histories. 606 $aWorld War, 1914-1918$zTurkey 607 $aTurkey$xHistory$yMehmed V, 1909-1918 607 $aTurkey$xHistory, Military$y20th century 615 0$aWorld War, 1914-1918 676 $a940.3/56 700 $aAksakal$b Mustafa$f1973-$0506894 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910454439303321 996 $aThe Ottoman road to war in 1914$92491896 997 $aUNINA