LEADER 03561nam 2200625 a 450 001 9910454147003321 005 20210117210554.0 010 $a1-281-97823-X 035 $a(CKB)1000000000722123 035 $a(OCoLC)654720994 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebrary10274616 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000484022 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12190536 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000484022 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10573547 035 $a(PQKB)10791467 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC3052922 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC4702465 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL4702465 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL197823 035 $a(OCoLC)1024278581 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000722123 100 $a20150424d1989|||| s|| | 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 04$aThe Economic theory of agrarian institutions /$fedited by Pranab Bardhan 210 $aOxford [England] $cClarendon Press ;$aNew York $cOxford University Press$d1989 215 $a1 online resource (417 p.) 225 1 $aClarendon Paperbacks 300 $aBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph 311 $a0-19-828619-8 311 $a0-19-152149-3 327 $aIntro -- Contents -- Contributors -- I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION -- 1. Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development -- 2. Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organization: Methodological Remarks for Development Economics -- II. LAND AND LABOUR -- 3. Theories of Sharecropping -- 4. A Comparison of Principal-Agent and Bargaining Solutions: The Case of Tenancy Contracts -- 5. Contracts with Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal-Agent Relationships -- 6. Production Relations in Semi-arid African Agriculture -- III. CREDIT AND INTERLINKED TRANSACTIONS -- 7. Rural Credit Markets: The Structure of Interest Rates, Exploitation, and Efficiency -- 8. Credit and Agrarian Class Structure -- 9. Credit Rationing, Tenancy, Productivity, and the Dynamics of Inequality -- 10. On Choice among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts -- 11.Some Aspects of Linked Product and Credit Market Contracts among Risk-neutral Agents -- 12. A Note on Interlinked Rural Economic Arrangements -- 13. Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition -- IV. MARKETING AND INSURANCE -- 14. Agricultural Institutions for Insurance and Stabilization -- 15. Peasants' Risk Aversion and the Choice of Marketing Intermediaries and Contracts: A Bargaining Theory of Equilibrium Marketing Contracts -- V. CO-OPERATIVES, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE STATE -- 16. Agricultural Producer Co-operatives -- 17. Institutional Analysis of Credit Co-operatives -- 18. Agrarian Structure, Technological Innovations, and the State -- Bibliography -- Index. 410 0$aClarendon Paperbacks 606 $aAgriculture$xEconomic aspects$zDeveloping countries 606 $aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS$2bisac 606 $aIndustries / Agribusiness$2bisac 606 $aBusiness & Economics$2HILCC 606 $aAgricultural Economics$2HILCC 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aAgriculture$xEconomic aspects 615 7$aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS 615 7$aIndustries / Agribusiness 615 7$aBusiness & Economics 615 7$aAgricultural Economics 676 $a338.1/09172/4 701 $aBardhan$b Pranab K$0120966 801 0$bPQKB 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910454147003321 996 $aThe Economic theory of agrarian institutions$92462135 997 $aUNINA