LEADER 03510nam 22006734a 450 001 9910453714203321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-281-92107-6 010 $a9786611921071 010 $a90-474-1954-5 024 7 $a10.1163/ej.9789004156616.i-268 035 $a(CKB)1000000000553977 035 $a(EBL)468265 035 $a(OCoLC)646789566 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000124250 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11139410 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000124250 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10012913 035 $a(PQKB)10260196 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC468265 035 $a(OCoLC)76925125 $z(OCoLC)77797552 035 $a(nllekb)BRILL9789047419549 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL468265 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10270826 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL192107 035 $a(PPN)174389663 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000553977 100 $a20061204d2007 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aCoercion, conversion and counterinsurgency in Louis XIV's France$b[electronic resource] 210 $aLeiden ;$aBoston $cBrill$d2007 215 $a1 online resource (276 p.) 225 1 $aHistory of warfare,$x1385-7827 ;$vv. 42 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a90-04-15661-5 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [253]-261) and index. 327 $tPreliminary Material /$rR.L. Mccullough -- $tIntroduction /$rR.L. Mccullough -- $tChapter One. ?Huissier, Garnisaire Et Soldat?: Coercion And Tax Collection Under Louis XIV /$rR.L. Mccullough -- $tChapter Two. The Response To Popular Revolt, 1662?1670 /$rR.L. Mccullough -- $tChapter Three. Regional Crisis And Royal Consolidation: The Revolts Of 1675 /$rR.L. Mccullough -- $tChapter Four. ?Les Missions Bottés?: Religious Coercion Under Louis XIV /$rR.L. Mccullough -- $tChapter Five. The Revolt Of The Camisards, 1702?1704 /$rR.L. Mccullough -- $tConclusion /$rR.L. Mccullough -- $tBibliography /$rR.L. Mccullough -- $tIndex /$rR.L. Mccullough. 330 $aThis is a study of the domestic application of armed coercion during the reign of Louis XIV. It examines the coercive aspects of tax collection, the royal response to tax revolts, and the use of force to convert the king?s Protestant subjects and to wage a devastating counterinsurgency campaign against Protestant rebels in the mountains and plains of Languedoc. Relying heavily on archival sources, the study demonstrates that both the coercive inclination of Louis XIV and the coercive capabilities of the French army have been overstated. This raises questions about some common assumptions regarding the role of the army in the projection of state power and its contribution to the process of state formation in Early Modern France. 410 0$aHistory of warfare ;$vv. 42. 606 $aPolitical violence$zFrance$xHistory 606 $aPersecution$zFrance$xHistory 607 $aFrance$xHistory$yLouis XIV, 1643-1715 607 $aFrance$xPolitics and government$y1643-1715 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aPolitical violence$xHistory. 615 0$aPersecution$xHistory. 676 $a944/.033 700 $aMcCullough$b Roy L$0870498 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910453714203321 996 $aCoercion, conversion and counterinsurgency in Louis XIV's France$91943181 997 $aUNINA