LEADER 04154nam 22007332 450 001 9910452669803321 005 20151005020622.0 010 $a1-139-88828-5 010 $a1-139-56417-X 010 $a1-139-55557-X 010 $a1-139-55432-8 010 $a1-139-01766-7 010 $a1-139-54936-7 010 $a1-139-55186-8 010 $a1-283-63826-6 010 $a1-139-55061-6 035 $a(CKB)2550000000707769 035 $a(EBL)989130 035 $a(OCoLC)813396539 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000753495 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11494744 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000753495 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10814995 035 $a(PQKB)10570718 035 $a(UkCbUP)CR9781139017664 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC989130 035 $a(PPN)193798840 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL989130 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10608465 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL395072 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000707769 100 $a20110216d2012|||| uy| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur||||||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aHigh courts and economic governance in Argentina and Brazil /$fDiana Kapiszewski, University of California, Irvine$b[electronic resource] 210 1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2012. 215 $a1 online resource (xi, 289 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s) 300 $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015). 311 $a1-107-00828-X 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $a1. High court-elected branch institutions in Latin America -- 2. Setting the scene: Latin America's triple transition and the judicialization of economic governance -- 3. Politicization and the political court in Argentina -- 4. Professionalism and the statesman court in Brazil -- 5. The political court and high court submission and inter-branch confrontation in Argentina -- 6. The statesman court and inter-branch accommodation in Brazil -- 7. Conclusions and implications. 330 $aHigh Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil analyzes how high courts and elected leaders in Latin America interacted over neoliberal restructuring, one of the most significant socioeconomic transformations in recent decades. Courts face a critical choice when deciding cases concerning national economic policy, weighing rule of law concerns against economic imperatives. Elected leaders confront equally difficult dilemmas when courts issue decisions challenging their actions. Based on extensive fieldwork in Argentina and Brazil, this study identifies striking variation in inter-branch interactions between the two countries. In Argentina, while the high court often defers to politicians in the economic realm, inter-branch relations are punctuated by tense bouts of conflict. The Brazilian high court and elected officials, by contrast, routinely accommodate one another in their decisions about economic policy. Diana Kapiszewski argues that the two high courts' contrasting characters - political in Argentina and statesman-like in Brazil - shape their decisions on controversial cases and condition how elected leaders respond to their rulings, channeling inter-branch interactions into persistent patterns. 517 3 $aHigh Courts & Economic Governance in Argentina & Brazil 606 $aCourts of last resort$zBrazil 606 $aCourts of last resort$zArgentina 606 $aPolitical questions and judicial power$zArgentina 606 $aPolitical questions and judicial power$zBrazil 607 $aBrazil$xEconomic policy 607 $aArgentina$xEconomic policy 615 0$aCourts of last resort 615 0$aCourts of last resort 615 0$aPolitical questions and judicial power 615 0$aPolitical questions and judicial power 676 $a343.8107/0269 700 $aKapiszewski$b Diana$01035215 801 0$bUkCbUP 801 1$bUkCbUP 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910452669803321 996 $aHigh courts and economic governance in Argentina and Brazil$92454794 997 $aUNINA