LEADER 04519nam 2200625Ia 450 001 9910452623503321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-4755-5233-5 010 $a1-4755-7725-7 035 $a(CKB)2550000000107538 035 $a(EBL)1606770 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000939844 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11511883 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000939844 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10937782 035 $a(PQKB)10740345 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1606770 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1606770 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10579624 035 $a(OCoLC)870244997 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000107538 100 $a20111102d2012 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aPublic investment, growth, and debt sustainability$b[electronic resource] $eputting together the pieces /$fEdward F. Buffie ...[et. al.] 210 $aWashington, D.C. $cInternational Monetary Fund$dc2012 215 $a1 online resource (55 p.) 225 1 $aIMF working paper ;$v12/144 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-4755-1165-5 311 $a1-4755-0407-1 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aCover; Table of Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; A. Firms; A.1. Technology; A.2. Factor Demands; B. Consumers; C. The Government; C.1. Infrastructure, Public Investment and Efficiency; C.2. Fiscal Adjustment and the Public Sector Budget Constraint; D. Market-Clearing Conditions and External Debt Accumulation; III. Calibration of the Model; Tables; Table 1. Base Case Calibration; IV. The Long-Run Outcome; Table 2. Public Investment Scaling Up, Concessional Borrowing, and Grants; A. Insights from a Simplified Model; Figures; Figure 1. The Long-run Outcome in the Simplified Model 327 $aB. Numerical SolutionsTable 3. Long-run Effects of Scaling up Public Investment by 3 Percent of Initial GDP; V. The Medium-Term Fiscal and Macroeconomic Adjustments under Different Financing Schemes; A. Unconstrained Tax Adjustment; A.1. The Base Case; Figure 2. Base Case: Unconstrained Tax Adjustment; A.2. More Optimistic and Troublesome Scenarios; Figure 3. Unconstrained Tax Adjustment: Optimistic and Troublesome Scenarios; A.3. Gradually Increasing Transfers, Efficiency, and the Collection Rate of User Fees; Figure 4. Unconstrained Tax Adjustment: The Size of the Scaling Up 327 $aFigure 5. Unconstrained Tax Adjustment: Increasing TransfersB. Constrained Tax Adjustment Combined with External Commercial Borrowing; B.1. Tax Smoothing and Private Demand Crowding Out; Figure 6. Unconstrained Tax Adjustment versus Constrained Tax Adjustment with External Commercial Borrowing; B.2. Debt Blowups: Structural and Policy Conditions; Figure 7. Constrained Tax Adjustment with External Commercial Borrowing: Varying the Structural and Policy Conditions; C. Constrained Tax Adjustment Combined with Domestic Borrowing 327 $aFigure 8. Constrained Tax Adjustment: Domestic Borrowing versus External Commercial BorrowingVI. External Shocks and Risks; Figure 9. External TOT Shocks: Shocks Persistence and Financing Schemes; Figure 10. TFP and Risk Premium Shocks and Risks; VII. Concluding Remarks; Appendix A. On Public Investment Efficiency, Rates of Return, and Growth; References 330 $aWe develop a model to study the macroeconomic effects of public investment surges in low-income countries, making explicit: (i) the investment-growth linkages; (ii) public external and domestic debt accumulation; (iii) the fiscal policy reactions necessary to ensure debt-sustainability; and (iv) the macroeconomic adjustment required to ensure internal and external balance. Well-executed high-yielding public investment programs can substantially raise output and consumption and be self-financing in the long run. However, even if the long run looks good, transition problems can be formidable whe 410 0$aIMF working paper ;$v12/144. 606 $aDebts, External$zDeveloping countries 606 $aFinance, Public$zDeveloping countries 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aDebts, External 615 0$aFinance, Public 676 $a332.152 700 $aBuffie$b Edward F$0118139 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910452623503321 996 $aPublic investment, growth, and debt sustainability$92205931 997 $aUNINA