LEADER 04379nam 22006731 450 001 9910451418303321 005 20021204165756.0 010 $a1-4725-6219-4 010 $a1-280-80056-9 010 $a9786610800568 010 $a1-84731-150-4 024 7 $a10.5040/9781472562197 035 $a(CKB)1000000000338585 035 $a(EBL)270667 035 $a(OCoLC)476004584 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000258239 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)12078702 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000258239 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10254132 035 $a(PQKB)11314204 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC1750715 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC270667 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL1750715 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10276361 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL80056 035 $a(OCoLC)893331536 035 $a(OCoLC)181844913 035 $a(UtOrBLW)bpp09256500 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL270667 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000338585 100 $a20140929d2000 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 12$aA theory of precedent $efrom analytical positivism to a post-analytical philosophy of law /$fby Raimo Siltala 205 $a1st ed. 210 1$aOxford [England] ;$aPortland, Oregon :$cHart Publishing,$d2000. 215 $a1 online resource (304 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a1-84113-123-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages [269]-278) and index. 327 $aPart A: How to Do Things with Precedents. 1 Frame of Analysis ; 2 The Concept of a Legal Norm: Legal Rules and Principles ; 3 A Theory of Precedent Ideology ; 4 Confrontations ; 5 Theory and Practice of Precedent-Following -- Part B: A Theory of the Multi-Level Structure of Law. 6 Towards a Rule of Law Ideology for Precedents ; 7 Discourse-Theoretical Frame of Law: Ratio and Auctoritas, and the Felicity Conditions of Legal Adjudication ; 8 The Quest for the Final Premises of Law - I: The Infrastructures of Legal Norm Constitution ; 9 The Quest for the Final Premises of Law - II: The Infrastructures of Judicial Signification under Precedent-Following ; 10 Summary. 330 $a"Analytical jurisprudence has been mostly silent on the role of precedent in legal adjudication. What is the content of a judge's precedent ideology,or the rule of precedent-recognition, by means of which the ratio of a case is to be distinguished from mere dicta? In this study, the author identifies six types of judicial precedent-ideology, among them judicial legislation, systemic construction of the underlying reasons of law in the Dworkinian sense, and a radical re-evaluation of the merits of a prior case in later adjudication, as envisioned by the American Realists. These competing models are tested against judicial experiences in the UK, US, France, Italy, Germany and Finland. By this means Lon Fuller's famous 'internal morality of law' is shown to function rather poorly in the context of precedents, and the author therefore suggests a redefinition of the rule which makes it work for precedent. This, in turn leads the author to confront fundamental questions about the normative nature of law. Is Kelsen's grundnorm or Hart's ultimate rule of recognition a valid rule, in the image of legal rules proper, or is it merely a social fact, observable only in the practices and behaviour of judges and other officials? The author claims that Hart is caught between Kelsen and J.L. Borges, the late Argentinian fabulist, in so far as the ontology and epistemology of the rule of recognition are concerned. This leads the author to the conclusion that the two predicaments affecting analytical positivism, namely the threat of endless self-referentiality, or infinite regress, can only be accounted for by means of recourse to the philosophy of deconstruction as posited by Jacques Derrida."--Bloomsbury Publishing. 606 $aLaw$xPhilosophy 606 $aStare decisis 606 $2Jurisprudence & philosophy of law 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aLaw$xPhilosophy. 615 0$aStare decisis. 676 $a340/.1 700 $aSiltala$b Raimo$01037180 801 0$bUtOrBLW 801 1$bUtOrBLW 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910451418303321 996 $aA theory of precedent$92457960 997 $aUNINA