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101 0 $aeng
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181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 14$aThe nature and authority of precedent /$fNeil Duxbury$b[electronic resource]
210  1$aCambridge :$cCambridge University Press,$d2008.
215   $a1 online resource (xv, 189 pages) $cdigital, PDF file(s)
300   $aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
311   $a0-521-71336-6 
311   $a0-521-88579-5 
320   $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
327   $apt. I. Introduction: the usable past. Precedent ; Positivism and precedent ; A theory of precedent? -- pt. II. Why does English law have a doctrine of precedent?. The formation of a doctrine of precedent -- pt. III. Precedents as reasons. Looking for a certain ratio ; Shortcuts to reason ; Pre-emptive precedent? ; Conclusion -- pt. IV. Distinguishing, overruling and the problem of self-reference. Distinguishing ; Overruling ; The power to overrule oneself ; The authority of the practice statement -- pt. V. Why follow precedent?. Consequentialist justifications ; Deontological arguments ; Conclusion.
330   $aNeil Duxbury examines how precedents constrain legal decision-makers and how legal decision-makers relax and avoid those constraints. There is no single principle or theory which explains the authority of precedent but rather a number of arguments which raise rebuttable presumptions in favour of precedent-following. This book examines the force and the limitations of these arguments and shows that although the principal requirement of the doctrine of precedent is that courts respect earlier judicial decisions on materially identical facts, the doctrine also requires courts to depart from such decisions when following them would perpetuate legal error or injustice. Not only do judicial precedents not 'bind' judges in the classical-positivist sense, but, were they to do so, they would be ill suited to common-law decision-making. Combining historical inquiry and philosophical analysis, this book will assist anyone seeking to understand how precedent operates as a common-law doctrine.
517 3 $aThe Nature & Authority of Precedent
606   $aStare decisis
606   $aJudicial process
606   $aStare decisis$zGreat Brtiain
606   $aJudicial process$zGreat Britain
615  0$aStare decisis.
615  0$aJudicial process.
615  0$aStare decisis
615  0$aJudicial process
676   $a340.11
700   $aDuxbury$b Neil$0624242
801  0$bUkCbUP
801  1$bUkCbUP
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910451383603321
996   $aThe nature and authority of precedent$92450463
997   $aUNINA