LEADER 04021nam 22005895 450 001 9910449950603321 005 20210819170601.0 010 $a1-282-76710-0 010 $a9786612767104 010 $a1-4008-2370-6 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400823703 035 $a(CKB)1000000000002028 035 $a(EBL)581624 035 $a(OCoLC)700688647 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000278564 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11222989 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000278564 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10247151 035 $a(PQKB)11788194 035 $a(DE-B1597)453533 035 $a(OCoLC)979834478 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400823703 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC581624 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000002028 100 $a20190708d2000 fg 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurnn#---|u||u 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aDemocratic Commitments $eLegislatures and International Cooperation /$fLisa L. Martin 205 $aCourse Book 210 1$aPrinceton, NJ :$cPrinceton University Press,$d[2000] 210 4$dİ2000 215 $a1 online resource (234 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 0 $a0-691-00924-4 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tPreface --$tCHAPTER 1. Introduction --$tCHAPTER 2. Theoretical Framework: Legislatures, Executives, and Commitment --$tCHAPTER 3. Institutions and Influence: Executive Agreements and Treaties --$tCHAPTER 4. Economic Sanctions: Domestic Conflict of Interest and International Cooperation --$tCHAPTER 5. U.S. Food-Aid Policy: The Politics of Delegation and Linkage --$tCHAPTER 6. National Parliaments and European Integration: Institutional Choice in EU Member States --$tCHAPTER 7. Implementing the EU's Internal Market: The Influence of National Parliaments --$tCHAPTER 8. Conclusion --$tReferences --$tIndex 330 $aFrom the refusal of the U.S. Congress to approve fast-track trade authority and certain foreign aid packages to the obstacles placed by Western European parliaments in the path of economic integration, legislatures often interfere with national leaders' efforts to reach and implement predictable international agreements. This seems to give an advantage to dictators, who can bluff with confidence and make decisions without consultation, and many assume that even democratic governments would do better to minimize political dissent and speak foreign policy from a single mouth. In this thoughtful, empirically grounded challenge to the assumption that messy domestic politics undermine democracies' ability to conduct international relations, Lisa Martin argues that legislatures--and particularly the apparently problematic openness of their proceedings--actually serve foreign policy well by giving credibility to the international commitments that are made. Examining the American cases of economic sanctions, the use of executive agreements versus treaties, and food assistance, in addition to the establishment of the European Union, Martin concludes that--if institutionalized--even rancorous domestic conversations between executives and legislatures augment rather than impede states' international dealings. Such interactions strengthen and legitimize states' bargaining positions and international commitments, increasing their capacity to realize international cooperation. By expanding our comprehension of how domestic politics affect international dialogue, this work is a major advance in the field of international relations and critical reading for those who study or forge foreign policy. 606 $aInternational cooperation 606 $aLegislative bodies 608 $aElectronic books. 615 0$aInternational cooperation. 615 0$aLegislative bodies. 676 $a328.73/0746 700 $aMartin$b Lisa L.$01038934 801 0$bDE-B1597 801 1$bDE-B1597 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910449950603321 996 $aDemocratic Commitments$92460809 997 $aUNINA