LEADER 05536nam 2200709Ia 450 001 9910139557803321 005 20230725053812.0 010 $a1-119-97381-3 010 $a1-283-40514-8 010 $a9786613405142 010 $a1-119-97793-2 035 $a(CKB)2550000000064708 035 $a(EBL)699377 035 $a(OCoLC)778356642 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000621970 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11385796 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000621970 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10637438 035 $a(PQKB)10169531 035 $a(OCoLC)764689249 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC699377 035 $a(CaSebORM)9780470662120 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL699377 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10510662 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL340514 035 $a(EXLCZ)992550000000064708 100 $a20100813d2011 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aSecuritisation and structured finance post credit crunch$b[electronic resource] $ea best practice deal lifecycle guide /$fby Markus Krebsz 205 $a2nd ed. 210 $aChichester, West Sussex $cWiley$d2011 215 $a1 online resource (477 p.) 225 1 $aThe Wiley Finance Series ;$vv.586 300 $aIncludes index. 311 $a0-470-71391-7 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [433]-434) and index. 327 $aSecuritization and Structured Finance Post Credit Crunch; Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Setting the scene: About this book; 1.2 Diagrammatical overview of deal lifecycle stages; 1.3 Role-based roadmap to the book; PART I THE CREDIT CRISIS AND BEYOND; 2 Looking back: What went wrong?; 2.1 Overview; 2.2 Data, disclosure, and standardization; 2.3 Paper reports; 2.4 Electronic reports; 2.5 Data feeds; 2.6 Definitions; 2.7 Reporting standards; 2.8 Underwriting standards; 2.9 Due diligence; 2.10 Deal motives; 2.11 Arbitrage; 2.12 Rating shopping 327 $a2.13 Overreliance on credit ratings2.14 Models, assumptions, and black boxes; 2.15 Proprietary analysis; 2.16 Risk management and risk mitigants; 2.17 Senior management awareness; 2.18 Lack of drilldown capability and group-wide controls; 2.19 Mark to market, mark to model, and pricing of illiquid bonds; 2.20 Government salvage schemes: What's next?; 2.21 Re-REMICS: Private vs. public ratings; 2.22 Conclusion; 3 Looking ahead: What has happened since?; 3.1 Current initiatives: An overview; 4 Sound practice principles; 4.1 Data; 4.2 Definitions; 4.3 Standards; 4.4 Investor focused 327 $a4.5 Motivation and deal drivers4.6 Analysis; PART II DEAL LIFECYCLE; 5 Strategy and feasibility; 5.1 Strategic considerations; 5.2 Key signs for securitization; 5.3 Deal structure type; 5.4 Asset classes; 5.5 Private issuance, public issuance, or conduit financing; 5.6 Credit enhancement and pricing; 5.7 Asset readiness and feasibility studies; 5.8 Documentation review; 5.9 Target portfolio and deal economics; 5.10 Indicative rating agency and financial modeling; 5.11 Ratings models; 5.12 Rating methodologies; 6 Pre close; 6.1 Typical execution timing; 6.2 Execution resources 327 $a6.3 Transaction counterparties6.4 Transaction documents; 6.5 Deal configuration; 7 At close; 7.1 Deal documents, marketing, and roadshow; 7.2 Pre-sale report; 7.3 Deal pricing and close; 7.4 New-issuance reports; 8 Post close; 8.1 Servicing and reporting; 8.2 Deal performance measurement; 8.3 The performance analytics process; 8.4 Deal redemption; PART III TOOLBOX; 9 Understanding complex transactions; 9.1 Structure diagrams; 9.2 Analytical capabilities; 9.3 The risk of overreliance on ratings; 9.4 Analytical roadmap; 10 Data; 10.1 The ''meaning'' of data; 10.2 Static information 327 $a10.3 Dynamic data points10.4 Data providers; PART IV ANALYTICAL TOOLS; 11 Vendors; 12 ABSXchange; 12.1 Introduction; 12.2 Performance data; 12.3 Pool performance; 12.4 Portfolio monitoring; 12.5 Creating benchmark indexes; 12.6 Cash flow analytics; 12.7 Single-bond cash flow analysis; 12.8 Single cash flow projection results; 12.9 Advanced functionality; 13 Bloomberg; 14 CapitalTrack; 14.1 Changing the data model used for structured finance instrument administration; 14.2 The big fly in the ointment; 14.3 CapitalTrack-the new model; 15 Fitch Solutions; 15.1 Products and services 327 $a15.2 Research services 330 $aStructured bonds are often viewed as complex and opaque, and participants in the securitization and structured finance markets have traditionally had a narrow focus on a specific part of the securitization value chain. However, in the post credit crunch environment, the market is more regulated, standardized, transparent, and better structured with closer-aligned and more balanced incentives for all participants, more focus on investors and improved comprehension of these bond instruments. In order for the market to succeed, it is vital that all participants take a broader view and understand 410 0$aWiley finance series. 606 $aAsset-backed financing 606 $aCorporations$xFinance 615 0$aAsset-backed financing. 615 0$aCorporations$xFinance. 676 $a332.6 676 $a332.632 700 $aKrebsz$b Markus$0958731 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910139557803321 996 $aSecuritisation and structured finance post credit crunch$92172371 997 $aUNINA LEADER 05035nam 22006613 450 001 9910440650303321 005 20240802201457.0 010 $a9781760464097 010 $a1760464090 035 $a(CKB)4100000011785036 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6519029 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL6519029 035 $a(OCoLC)1251443329 035 $a(oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/64032 035 $a(Perlego)2804724 035 $a(oapen)doab64032 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000011785036 100 $a20210901d2021 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aBritain's Second Embassy to China $eLord Amherst's 'Special Mission' to the Jiaqing Emperor In 1816 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aCanberra$cANU Press$d2021 210 1$aCanberra :$cANU Press,$d2021. 210 4$dİ2021. 215 $a1 online resource (404 pages) 327 $aIntro -- Acknowledgements -- Note on Terminology and Romanisation and Monetary Values -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Political Setting of the Amherst Embassy -- 3. Origins of the Amherst Embassy: Canton and Sir George Thomas Staunton -- 4. The View from London: John Barrow and Lord William Pitt Amherst -- 5. Amherst's Preparations for the Embassy -- 6. The Voyage from Portsmouth to 'Hong Kong' -- 7. Up the Coast of China and Arrival at Tianjin -- 8. The Imperial Banquet of 13 August 1816 and Progress to Tongzhou -- 9. To Yuanmingyuan, Reception and Dismissal -- 10. Overland to Canton: The British Cultural Encounter with China -- 11. Aftermath: Britain's Reaction to the Failure of the Amherst Embassy -- 12. Retrospect: Reflections on the Amherst Embassy -- Bibliography -- Appendix A: List of Persons and Their Salaries -- Appendix B: Presents and Cost of the Amherst Embassy -- Appendix C: The Total Cost of the Amherst Embassy -- Appendix D: Ball's Secret Report (Commissioner of Teas at Canton) -- Appendix E: List of Chinese Officials Responsible for the Conduct of the Amherst Embassy -- Appendix F: Imperial Edict: 'Ceremonies to Be Observed at the Audience of Leave' -- Appendix G: Substance of an Edict Seen on the Walls of a Building in the 8th Moon of the 21st Year of Kia King -- Appendix H: Itinerary of the Amherst Embassy -- Appendix I: Morrison's Letters to Amherst (1821) -- Index. 330 $aLord Amherst's diplomatic mission to the Qing Court in 1816 was the second British embassy to China. The first led by Lord Macartney in 1793 had failed to achieve its goals. It was thought that Amherst had better prospects of success, but the intense diplomatic encounter that greeted his arrival ended badly. Amherst never appeared before the Jiaqing emperor and his embassy was expelled from Peking on the day it arrived. Historians have blamed Amherst for this outcome, citing his over-reliance on the advice of his Second Commissioner, Sir George Thomas Staunton, not to kowtow before the emperor. Detailed analysis of British sources reveal that Amherst was well informed on the kowtow issue and made his own decision for which he took full responsibility. Success was always unlikely because of irreconcilable differences in approach. China?s conduct of foreign relations based on the tributary system required submission to the emperor, thus relegating all foreign emissaries and the rulers they represented to vassal status, whereas British diplomatic practice was centred on negotiation and Westphalian principles of equality between nations. The Amherst embassy?s failure revised British assessments of China and led some observers to believe that force, rather than diplomacy, might be required in future to achieve British goals. The Opium War of 1840 that followed set a precedent for foreign interference in China, resulting in a century of 'humiliation?. This resonates today in President Xi Jinping?s call for ?National Rejuvenation? to restore China?s historic place at the centre of a new Sino-centric global order. 517 $aBritain's Second Embassy to China 606 $aBritish & Irish history$2bicssc 606 $aAsian history$2bicssc 606 $aModern history to 20th century: c 1700 to c 1900$2bicssc 607 $aGreat Britain$xForeign relations$zChina 607 $aChina$xForeign relations$zGreat Britain 607 $aChina$xHistory$y19th century 610 $aChina 610 $aBritain 610 $aBritish Empire 610 $aWilliam Pitt 610 $aAmherst 610 $aCanton 610 $aKowtow 610 $atributary system 615 7$aBritish & Irish history 615 7$aAsian history 615 7$aModern history to 20th century: c 1700 to c 1900 676 $a941.081092 700 $aStevenson$b Caroline$0850276 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910440650303321 996 $aBritain's Second Embassy to China$91898622 997 $aUNINA