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101 0 $aeng
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181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
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200 10$aMinimal Cooperation and Shared Agency /$fedited by Anika Fiebich
205   $a1st ed. 2020.
210  1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2020.
215   $a1 online resource (218 pages)
225 1 $aStudies in the Philosophy of Sociality,$x2542-9108 ;$v11
311   $a3-030-29782-9 
327   $aChapter 1. Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency (Anika Fiebich) -- Part I. Minimal Cooperation -- Chapter 2. What is Minimally Cooperative Behaviour? (Kirk Ludwig) -- Chapter 3. Social Groups, Roles, and Cooperation (Katherine Ritchie) -- Chapter 4. Conversation, Context, and Joint Action (Shaun Gallagher) -- Chapter 5. Towards a Blueprint for a Social Animal (Stephen Butterfill) -- Chapter 6. Natural Intersubjectivity and Minimal Cooperation (Michael Wilby) -- Chapter 7. Emerging Joint Actions (Cédric Paternotte) -- Part II. Minimal Shared Agency -- Chapter 8. Shared Intention: If It Is ?lite?, Then It Is Dark (Thomas Smith) -- Chapter 9. What do We Experience of Actions When We Act Together With a Purpose? (Corrado Sinigaglia) -- Chapter 10. Shared Agency and the Cooperative Evolutionary Thesis (Glenda Satne) -- Chapter 11. Group Metamemory: Does Collaborative Remembering Imply Group Metacognition? (Santiago Arango-Munoz) -- Chapter 12. Proprietary Reasons and Shared Agency (Abraham Roth) -- Chapter 13. The Cognitive Basis of Institutions (Francesco Guala). .
330   $aThis volume examines minimality in cooperation and shared agency from various angles. It features essays written by top scholars in the philosophy of mind and action. Taken together, the essays provide a genuine contribution to the contemporary joint action debate. The main accounts in this debate present sufficient rather than necessary or minimal criteria for there to be cooperation. Much discussion in the debate deals with robust rather than more attenuate and simple cases of cooperation or shared agency. Focusing on such minimal cases, however, may help to explain how cooperation comes into existence and how minimal cooperation interrelates with more complex cases of cooperation. The contributors discuss minimality in cooperation by focusing on particular aspects. For example, they consider how social roles might deliver minimal cooperation constraints or what the minimal contextual criteria are for cooperation to emerge. Readers will find the answers to these and other questions: What is minimally cooperative behavior? By what steps could full members of a society organized by conventions, norms and institutions be constructed from creatures with minimal social skills and cognitive abilities? What do we experience of actions when we act together with a purpose?
410  0$aStudies in the Philosophy of Sociality,$x2542-9108 ;$v11
606   $aPhilosophy of mind
606   $aCommunity psychology
606   $aSocial choice
606   $aWelfare economics
606   $aSocial sciences$xPhilosophy
606   $aPhilosophy of Mind
606   $aCommunity Psychology
606   $aSocial Choice and Welfare
606   $aSocial Theory
615  0$aPhilosophy of mind.
615  0$aCommunity psychology.
615  0$aSocial choice.
615  0$aWelfare economics.
615  0$aSocial sciences$xPhilosophy.
615 14$aPhilosophy of Mind.
615 24$aCommunity Psychology.
615 24$aSocial Choice and Welfare.
615 24$aSocial Theory.
676   $a128.2
702   $aFiebich$b Anika$4edt$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
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906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910409986203321
996   $aMinimal Cooperation and Shared Agency$92133996
997   $aUNINA