LEADER 03752nam 22005535 450 001 9910390859003321 005 20220301231424.0 010 $a3-030-40216-9 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-030-40216-7 035 $a(CKB)4100000010770843 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC6142818 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-030-40216-7 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000010770843 100 $a20200320d2020 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aGetting to Know the World Scientifically $eAn Objective View /$fby Paul Needham 205 $a1st ed. 2020. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2020. 215 $a1 online resource (x, 176 pages) 225 1 $aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,$x0166-6991 ;$v423 311 $a3-030-40215-0 327 $aPreface -- PART I: Knowledge, Objectivity and Values. Chapter 1. Knowledge -- Chapter 2. Objectivity -- Chapter 3. Relativism -- Chapter 4. The Use and Abuse of Science -- PART II: Philosophies of Science. Chapter 5. Popper: Proving the Worth of Hypotheses -- Chapter 6. Duhem?s Continuity Thesis -- Chapter 7. Realism and the Advancement of Knowledge -- Bibliography -- Index. 330 $aThis undergraduate textbook introduces some fundamental issues in philosophy of science for students of philosophy and science students. The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with knowledge and values. Chap. 1 presents the classical conception of knowledge as initiated by the ancient Greeks and elaborated during the development of science, introducing the central concepts of truth, belief and justification. Aspects of the quest for objectivity are taken up in the following two chapters. Moral issues are broached in Chap. 4, which discusses some aspects of the use and abuse of science, taking up the responsibilities of scientists in properly conducting their business and decision-makers in their concerns with the import of science for society. Part 2 contrasts the view of scientific progress as the rejecting of old hypotheses and theories and replacing them with new ones, represented by Karl Popper, with the conception of progress as accumulating knowledge, saving as much as possible from older theories, represented by Pierre Duhem. A concluding chapter defends the natural attitude of taking the theories of modern science to be literally true, i.e. realism, in the face of arguments drawn partly from the history of scientific progress in criticism of this stance. 410 0$aSynthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science,$x0166-6991 ;$v423 606 $aPhilosophy and science 606 $aHistory 606 $aPhysics 606 $aPhilosophy of Science$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E34000 606 $aHistory of Science$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/731000 606 $aHistory and Philosophical Foundations of Physics$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/P29000 615 0$aPhilosophy and science. 615 0$aHistory. 615 0$aPhysics. 615 14$aPhilosophy of Science. 615 24$aHistory of Science. 615 24$aHistory and Philosophical Foundations of Physics. 676 $a501 700 $aNeedham$b Paul$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0352359 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910390859003321 996 $aGetting to Know the World Scientifically$92212233 997 $aUNINA