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101 0 $aeng
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181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
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200 14$aThe Attentional Shaping of Perceptual Experience $eAn Investigation into Attention and Cognitive Penetrability /$fby Francesco Marchi
205   $a1st ed. 2020.
210  1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2020.
215   $a1 online resource (170 pages)
225 1 $aStudies in Brain and Mind,$x1573-4536 ;$v16
311   $a3-030-33557-7 
327   $aChapter 1. A Play with Two Characters: Perception and Cognition -- Chapter 2. The Cognitive Processing Hierarchy -- Chapter 3. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perceptual Experience -- Chapter 4. Attention and the Shaping of Experience -- Chapter 5. Toward a Theory of Attention -- Chapter 6. How Attentional Cognitive Penetration Works -- Chapter 7. Expectations and Predictions as a Model of Cognition -- Chapter 8. A Predictive Model of Attentional Cognitive Penetration.
330   $aThis monograph presents a clear account of when and how attentional processes can shape perceptual experience. This argument is based on the prediction-error minimization model of the mind. The author believes that the topic of attention should take a more central role in the debate about the influence of cognition on perception. Inside, he shows how this can be possible. The hypothesis that cognition may shape perceptual experience has been traditionally labeled as the cognitive penetrability of perceptual experience. Cognitive penetrability is relevant for several debates in philosophy and cognitive science. It tackles the possibility of gathering genuine knowledge on the basis of perceptual information about the world delivered by sensory channels. The problem, the author notes, is that if our previously acquired belief can shape current perceptual experiences, such experiences cannot serve as an adequate source of justification in retaining those beliefs or even forming new ones. He argues that cognitive penetration may sometimes happen through attentional processes, but that its occurrence need not undermine perceptual justification. The book provides an overview of the cognitive penetrability debate. The author discusses evidence that supports the occurrence of this phenomenon. Overall, this investigation offers readers a philosophical discussion of attention based on the biased-competition theory. It argues that attention is a property of mental representations that emerges from a metacognitive competition process.
410  0$aStudies in Brain and Mind,$x1573-4536 ;$v16
606   $aPhilosophy of mind
606   $aCognitive psychology
606   $aPhilosophy of Mind$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E31000
606   $aCognitive Psychology$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/Y20060
615  0$aPhilosophy of mind.
615  0$aCognitive psychology.
615 14$aPhilosophy of Mind.
615 24$aCognitive Psychology.
676   $a153.7
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700   $aMarchi$b Francesco$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0898244
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906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910373945603321
996   $aThe Attentional Shaping of Perceptual Experience$92007056
997   $aUNINA