LEADER 04314nam 22006375 450 001 9910369908003321 005 20200701225706.0 010 $a3-030-21398-6 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-030-21398-5 035 $a(CKB)4100000008493423 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-030-21398-5 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5797252 035 $a(PPN)259218103 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000008493423 100 $a20190622d2020 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurnn|008mamaa 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aNuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability in South Asia /$fby Devin T. Hagerty 205 $a1st ed. 2020. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Palgrave Pivot,$d2020. 215 $a1 online resource (XVIII, 134 p.) 225 1 $aPalgrave pivot 311 $a3-030-21397-8 327 $a1 Introduction -- 2 India-Pakistan Crises, 1999-2016 -- 3 Explaining Indian Moderation During Crises, 1999-2016 -- 4 Deterrence Stability in South Asia Today -- 5 Enhancing India-Pakistan Deterrence Stability. 330 $a?This is a carefully argued, empirically sound and theoretically deft analysis of deterrence stability and its limits in South Asia. It provides appropriate details about the diplomatic and strategic postures of both India and Pakistan, and it discusses possible pathways for enhancing deterrence stability in the region.? ?Sumit Ganguly, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA ?In this compact volume, Devin Hagerty provides a multi-layered account that is both theoretically informed and empirically grounded. It will be essential reading for students, scholars, and practitioners interested in understanding the South Asian security environment and deterrence more generally.? ?S. Paul Kapur, Professor, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, USA This book examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, two highly antagonistic South Asian neighbors who recently moved into their third decade of overt nuclear weaponization. It assesses the stability of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence and argues that, while deterrence dampens the likelihood of escalation to conventional?and possibly nuclear?war, the chronically embittered relations between New Delhi and Islamabad mean that deterrence failure resulting in major warfare cannot be ruled out. Through an empirical examination of the effects of nuclear weapons during five crises between India and Pakistan since 1998, as well as a discussion of the theoretical logic of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence, the book offers suggestions for enhancing deterrence stability between these two countries. Devin T. Hagerty is Professor of Political Science at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, USA. 410 0$aPalgrave pivot. 606 $aPolitics and war 606 $aInternational relations 606 $aPeace 606 $aAsia?History 606 $aDiplomacy 606 $aMilitary and Defence Studies$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/912080 606 $aForeign Policy$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/912040 606 $aConflict Studies$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/912060 606 $aHistory of South Asia$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/715040 606 $aDiplomacy$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/912020 615 0$aPolitics and war. 615 0$aInternational relations. 615 0$aPeace. 615 0$aAsia?History. 615 0$aDiplomacy. 615 14$aMilitary and Defence Studies. 615 24$aForeign Policy. 615 24$aConflict Studies. 615 24$aHistory of South Asia. 615 24$aDiplomacy. 676 $a355 676 $a355 700 $aHagerty$b Devin T$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$01058397 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910369908003321 996 $aNuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability in South Asia$92499660 997 $aUNINA