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101 0 $aeng
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200 14$aThe World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling$b[electronic resource] $eOn Affect and Intentionality /$fby Jean Moritz Müller
205   $a1st ed. 2019.
210  1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Palgrave Pivot,$d2019.
215   $a1 online resource (163 pages)
311   $a3-030-23819-9 
327   $aChapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: Feelings and Formal Objects -- Chapter 3: Emotional Feeling as Receptivity to Value -- Chapter 4: Emotional Feeling as Position-Taking -- Chapter 5: The Evaluative Foundation of Emotional Feeling -- Chapter 6: Conclusion.
330   $a ?The sustained criticisms Müller offers of standard accounts of emotional feeling should be taken seriously, and Müller's positive account is rich and interesting on its own [?] The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling amply repays the time invested in reading it.? ? Bennett Helm, Franklin & Marshall College, Pennsylvania, USA ?Concerning the widely discussed idea of the specific intentionality of emotions, Müller provides an original account. [?] Rigorous, clear and accurate, this is a very fruitful endeavour.? ? Eva Weber-Guskar, Guest Professor of Philosophy, Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany This book engages with what are widely recognized as the two core dimensions of emotion. When we are afraid, glad or disappointed, we feel a certain way; moreover, our emotion is intentional or directed at something: we are afraid of something, glad or disappointed about something. Connecting with a vital strand of recent philosophical thinking, Müller conceives of these two aspects of emotion as unified. Examining different possible ways of developing the view that the feeling dimension of emotion is itself intentional, he argues against the currently popular view that it is a form of perception-like receptivity to value. Müller instead proposes that emotional feeling is a specific type of response to value, an affective ?position-taking?. This alternative conceives of emotional feeling as intimately related to our cares and concerns. While situating itself within the analytic-philosophical debate on emotion, the discussion crucially draws on ideas from the early phenomenological tradition and thinks past the theoretical strictures of many contemporary approaches to this subject. The result is an innovative view of emotional feeling as a thoroughly personal form of engagement with value.
606   $aPhilosophy of mind
606   $aEmotions
606   $aPhenomenology 
606   $aEthics
606   $aPhilosophy of Mind$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E31000
606   $aEmotion$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/Y20140
606   $aPhenomenology$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E44070
606   $aEthics$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E14000
615  0$aPhilosophy of mind.
615  0$aEmotions.
615  0$aPhenomenology .
615  0$aEthics.
615 14$aPhilosophy of Mind.
615 24$aEmotion.
615 24$aPhenomenology.
615 24$aEthics.
676   $a128.37
700   $aMüller$b Jean Moritz$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0974397
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910349549203321
996   $aThe World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling$92218349
997   $aUNINA