LEADER 03247nam 22004815 450 001 9910349547503321 005 20240508233121.0 010 $a9783030216757 010 $a3030216756 024 7 $a10.1007/978-3-030-21675-7 035 $a(CKB)4100000009152691 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC5887826 035 $a(DE-He213)978-3-030-21675-7 035 $a(Perlego)3492839 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000009152691 100 $a20190827d2019 u| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcnu|||||||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aPhilosophy and the 'Dazzling Ideal' of Science /$fby Graham McFee 205 $a1st ed. 2019. 210 1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Palgrave Macmillan,$d2019. 215 $a1 online resource (348 pages) 311 08$a9783030216740 311 08$a3030216748 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aChapter One: Introductory - A still point in a turning world? -- Chapter Two: Persons as Agents: The Possibility of Genuine Action -- Chapter Three: What Persons Are: Identity, Personal Identity and Composition -- Chapter Four: What Persons are Not: Causality, Minds and the Brain -- Chapter Five: Evolutionary Explanation in Psychology: Not an Issue for Philosophy? -- Chapter Six: Persons, Artificial Intelligence, and Science Fiction Thought-Experiments -- Chapter Seven: Considerations of Exceptionlessness in Philosophy: or, 'Everything ... ' -- Chapter Eight: Philosophy without Exceptionlessness -- Chapter Nine: Conclusion: The Place of Reason. 330 $aRecent decades have seen attacks on philosophy as an irrelevant field of inquiry when compared with science. In this book, Graham McFee defends the claims of philosophy against attempts to minimize either philosophy's possibility or its importance by deploying a contrast with what Wittgenstein characterized as the "dazzling ideal" of science. This 'dazzling ideal' incorporates both the imagined completeness of scientific explanation-whereby completing its project would leave nothing unexplained-and the exceptionless character of the associated conception of causality. On such a scientistic world-view, what need is there for philosophy? In his defense of philosophy (and its truth-claims), McFee shows that rejecting such scientism is not automatically anti-scientific, and that it permits granting to natural science (properly understood) its own truth-generating power. Further, McFee argues for contextualism in the project of philosophy, and sets aside the pervasive(and pernicious) requirement for exceptionless generalizations while relating his account to interconnections between the concepts of person, substance, agency, and causation. 606 $aPhilosophy of mind 606 $aSelf 606 $aPhilosophy of the Self 615 0$aPhilosophy of mind. 615 0$aSelf. 615 14$aPhilosophy of the Self. 676 $a100 676 $a100 700 $aMcFee$b Graham$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0887398 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910349547503321 996 $aPhilosophy and the 'Dazzling Ideal' of Science$92021802 997 $aUNINA