LEADER 01813nam  2200409z- 450 
001 9910346959903321
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010   $a1-000-07208-8
035   $a(CKB)4920000000100923
035   $a(oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/59940
035   $a(EXLCZ)994920000000100923
100   $a20202102d2017      |y             0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurmn|---annan
181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
183   $acr$2rdacarrier
200 10$aStability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations - An analysis using cooperative game theory
210   $cKIT Scientific Publishing$d2017
215   $a1 electronic resource (XXII, 221 p. p.)
311   $a3-7315-0700-5 
330   $aInternational cooperation on greenhouse gas emission reductions is needed to avoid dangerous climate change. This work analyses the stability of global cooperation on climate change using cooperative game theory. Numerical and theoretical models are applied to evaluate the impact of several real-world properties. It is shown that the introduction of these properties into the game-theoretical model substantially affects the results and can make global climate cooperation unstable.
610   $aKooperation
610   $aInternationale ökonomische Effekte
610   $aKlimawandel
610   $aStabilität
610   $ainternational economic effects
610   $agame theory
610   $aSpieltheorie
610   $astability
610   $aclimate change
610   $acooperation
700   $aKersting$b Jan$4auth$01281088
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910346959903321
996   $aStability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations - An analysis using cooperative game theory$93018034
997   $aUNINA