LEADER 05129nam 2200673Ia 450 001 9910345150403321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-282-08673-1 010 $a9786612086731 010 $a1-4008-2814-7 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400828142 035 $a(CKB)1000000000756227 035 $a(EBL)445470 035 $a(OCoLC)368358168 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000235005 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11206050 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000235005 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10241942 035 $a(PQKB)10332225 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36511 035 $a(DE-B1597)446972 035 $a(OCoLC)979741819 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400828142 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL445470 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10284066 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL208673 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC445470 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000756227 100 $a20071115d2008 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurcn||||||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aRegulation and public interests $ethe possibility of good regulatory government /$fSteven P. Croley 205 $aCourse Book 210 $aPrinceton $cPrinceton University Press$dc2008 215 $a1 online resource (391 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-13085-X 311 $a0-691-13464-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $tFront matter --$tContents --$tAcknowledgments --$tIntroduction. An Uneasy Commitment to Regulatory Government --$tPART I. THE CYNICAL VIEW OF REGULATORY GOVERNMENT, AND ITS ALTERNATIVES --$tChapter One. The Basic Project --$tChapter Two. The Cynical View of Regulation --$tChapter Three. Is Regulatory Capture Inevitable? --$tChapter Four. Alternative Visions of Regulatory Government --$tPART II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATORY STATE --$tINTRODUCTION TO PART 2 --$tChapter Five. Opening the Black Box: Regulatory Decision making in Legal Context --$tChapter Six. Regulatory Government as Administrative Government --$tChapter Seven. Participation in Administrative Decision making --$tChapter Eight. The Administrative-Process Approach Expanded: A More Developed Picture --$tPART III. PUBLIC INTERESTED REGULATION --$tINTRODUCTION TO PART 3 --$tChapter Nine. The Environmental Protection Agency's Ozone and Particulate Matter Rules --$tChapter Ten. The Food and Drug Administration's Tobacco Initiative --$tChapter Eleven. The Forest Service's Roadless Policy for National Forests --$tChapter Twelve. Socially Beneficial Administrative Decision making: Additional Evidence --$tPART IV. PUBLIC CHOICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS --$tINTRODUCTION TO PART 4 --$tChapter Thirteen. The Public Choice Theory Revisited --$tChapter Fourteen. The Promise of an Administrative-Process Orientation --$tChapter Fifteen. Regulatory Rents, Regulatory Failures, and Other Objections --$tConclusion. The Regulatory State and Social Welfare --$tNotes --$tIndex 330 $aNot since the 1960's have U.S. politicians, Republican or Democrat, campaigned on platforms defending big government, much less the use of regulation to help solve social ills. And since the late 1970's, "deregulation" has become perhaps the most ubiquitous political catchword of all. This book takes on the critics of government regulation. Providing the first major alternative to conventional arguments grounded in public choice theory, it demonstrates that regulatory government can, and on important occasions does, advance general interests. Unlike previous accounts, Regulation and Public Interests takes agencies' decision-making rules rather than legislative incentives as a central determinant of regulatory outcomes. Drawing from both political science and law, Steven Croley argues that such rules, together with agencies' larger decision-making environments, enhance agency autonomy. Agency personnel inclined to undertake regulatory initiatives that generate large but diffuse benefits (while imposing smaller but more concentrated costs) can use decision-making rules to develop socially beneficial regulations even over the objections of Congress and influential interest groups. This book thus provides a qualified defense of regulatory government. Its illustrative case studies include the development of tobacco rulemaking by the Food and Drug Administration, ozone and particulate matter rules by the Environmental Protection Agency, the Forest Service's "roadless" policy for national forests, and regulatory initiatives by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission. 606 $aAdministrative law$xEconomic aspects 606 $aSocial choice 606 $aTrade regulation 615 0$aAdministrative law$xEconomic aspects. 615 0$aSocial choice. 615 0$aTrade regulation. 676 $a352.801 700 $aCroley$b Steven P.$f1965-$01046718 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910345150403321 996 $aRegulation and public interests$92473841 997 $aUNINA