LEADER 03848nam 2200733 a 450 001 9910345143503321 005 20200520144314.0 010 $a1-282-15756-6 010 $a9786612157561 010 $a1-4008-2863-5 024 7 $a10.1515/9781400828630 035 $a(CKB)1000000000788421 035 $a(EBL)457779 035 $a(OCoLC)436045297 035 $a(SSID)ssj0000101276 035 $a(PQKBManifestationID)11999151 035 $a(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000101276 035 $a(PQKBWorkID)10037381 035 $a(PQKB)11568688 035 $a(OCoLC)647823226 035 $a(MdBmJHUP)muse36525 035 $a(DE-B1597)446589 035 $a(OCoLC)979779353 035 $a(DE-B1597)9781400828630 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL457779 035 $a(CaPaEBR)ebr10312508 035 $a(CaONFJC)MIL215756 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC457779 035 $a(EXLCZ)991000000000788421 100 $a20060530d2007 uy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aur|n|---||||| 181 $ctxt 182 $cc 183 $acr 200 10$aAll politics is global $eexplaining international regulatory regimes /$fDaniel W. Drezner ; with a new afterword by the author 205 $aWith a New afterword by the author 210 $aPrinceton, N.J. $cPrinceton University Press$dc2007 215 $a1 online resource (265 p.) 300 $aDescription based upon print version of record. 311 $a0-691-09641-4 311 $a0-691-09642-2 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 327 $aBringing the great powers back in -- A theory of regulatory outcomes -- A typology of governance processes -- The global governance of the internet -- Club standards and international finance -- Rival standards and genetically modified organisms -- The "semi-deviant" case : trips and public health. 327 $apt. 1. Theory -- pt. 2. Practice. 330 $aHas globalization diluted the power of national governments to regulate their own economies? Are international governmental and nongovernmental organizations weakening the hold of nation-states on global regulatory agendas? Many observers think so. But in All Politics Is Global, Daniel Drezner argues that this view is wrong. Despite globalization, states--especially the great powers--still dominate international regulatory regimes, and the regulatory goals of states are driven by their domestic interests. As Drezner shows, state size still matters. The great powers--the United States and the European Union--remain the key players in writing global regulations, and their power is due to the size of their internal economic markets. If they agree, there will be effective global governance. If they don't agree, governance will be fragmented or ineffective. And, paradoxically, the most powerful sources of great-power preferences are the least globalized elements of their economies. Testing this revisionist model of global regulatory governance on an unusually wide variety of cases, including the Internet, finance, genetically modified organisms, and intellectual property rights, Drezner shows why there is such disparity in the strength of international regulations. 606 $aGlobalization$xGovernment policy 606 $aGlobalization$xPolitical aspects 606 $aGlobalization$xSocial aspects 606 $aGlobalization$xEconomic aspects 615 0$aGlobalization$xGovernment policy. 615 0$aGlobalization$xPolitical aspects. 615 0$aGlobalization$xSocial aspects. 615 0$aGlobalization$xEconomic aspects. 676 $a341.2 686 $a89.70$2bcl 700 $aDrezner$b Daniel W$0761393 801 0$bMiAaPQ 801 1$bMiAaPQ 801 2$bMiAaPQ 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910345143503321 996 $aAll politics is global$92462806 997 $aUNINA