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181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
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200 10$aInterpretation without Truth $eA Realistic Enquiry /$fby Pierluigi Chiassoni
205   $a1st ed. 2019.
210  1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2019.
215   $a1 online resource (284 pages)
225 1 $aLaw and Philosophy Library,$x2215-0315 ;$v128
311   $a3-030-15588-9 
327   $a1. Introduction: The Path of Analytical Realism -- 2. Interpretation, Truth, and the Logical Forms of Interpretive Discourse -- 3. Interpretive Games -- 4. Taking Context Seriously -- 5. Frames v. Containers -- 6. Towards Pragmatic Realism -- 7. Legal Gaps -- 8. Judicial Fictions -- 9. Precedent -- 10. Defeasibility and Legal Indeterminacy -- 11. Legislation.
330   $aThis book engages in an analytical and realistic enquiry into legal interpretation and a selection of related matters including legal gaps, judicial fictions, judicial precedent, legal defeasibility, and legislation. Chapter 1 provides an outline of the central theoretical and methodological tenets of analytical realism. Chapter 2 presents a conceptual apparatus concerning the phenomenon of legal interpretation, which it subsequently applies to investigate the truth-in-legal-interpretation issue. Chapters 3 to 6 argue for a theory of legal interpretation - pragmatic realism - by outlining a theory of interpretive games, revisiting the debate between literalism and contextualism in contemporary philosophy of language, and underscoring the many shortcomings of the container-retrieval view and pragmatic formalism. In turn, Chapter 7, focusing on comparative legal theory, advocates an interpretation-sensitive theory of legal gaps, as opposed to purely normativist ones. Chapter 8 explores the connection between judicial reasoning and judicial fictions, casting light on the structure and purpose of fictional reasoning. Chapter 9 provides an analytical enquiry into judicial precedent, examining a variety of ideal-typical systems in terms of their normative or de iure relevance. Chapter 10 addresses defeasibility and legal indeterminacy. In closing, Chapter 11 highlights the central tenets of a realistic theory of legislation.
410  0$aLaw and Philosophy Library,$x2215-0315 ;$v128
606   $aLaw$xPhilosophy
606   $aLaw$xHistory
606   $aTheories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History
606   $aPhilosophy of Law
615  0$aLaw$xPhilosophy.
615  0$aLaw$xHistory.
615 14$aTheories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History.
615 24$aPhilosophy of Law.
676   $a340.1
676   $a340.115
700   $aChiassoni$b Pierluigi$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0254330
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910337834403321
996   $aInterpretation without Truth$91756618
997   $aUNINA