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035   $a(DE-He213)978-3-030-03571-6
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035   $a(PPN)232964238
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100   $a20181228d2019      u|         0
101 0 $aeng
135   $aurnn|008mamaa
181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
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200 10$aLegal Conventionalism /$fedited by Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña, Josep M. Vilajosana
205   $a1st ed. 2019.
210  1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2019.
215   $a1 online resource (VI, 198 p.) 
225 1 $aLaw and Philosophy Library,$x1572-4395 ;$v126
311   $a3-030-03570-0 
327   $aPart 1 The Notion of Convention -- Pre-conventions. A Fragment of the Background -- Re-examining Deep Conventions: Practical Reason and Forward-Looking Agency -- Part II Conventions and The Rule of Recognition -- Conventions, Reasons, and the Law -- The Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Convention -- Social Facts and Law: Why is the Rule of Recognition a Convention? -- Cooperative Conventions, Rule of Recognition and Institutional Practices -- On Identifying the Law and Its Supposed Conventional Foundations. A Set-Theory Approach -- Part III Conventions and Legal Interpretation -- Conventionalism Unchained and Sceptical. A Defence of a Quasi-Realist Account of Legal Statements Against Dworkin?s Criticisms -- Conventionalism and the Causal Theory of Reference -- The Interpretation of Plans.
330   $aThe concept of convention has been used in different fields and from different perspectives to account for important social phenomena, and the legal sphere is no exception. Rather, reflection on whether the legal phenomenon is based on a convention and, if so, what kind of convention is involved, has become a recurring issue in contemporary legal theory. In this book, some of the foremost specialists in the field make significant contributions to this debate. In the first part, the concept of convention is analysed. The second part reflects on whether the rule of recognition postulated by Hart can be understood as a convention and discusses its potential and limitations in order to explain the institutional and normative character of law. Lastly, the third part critically examines the relations between conventionalism and legal interpretation. Given the content and quality of the contributions, the book is of interest to those wanting to understand the current state of the art in legal conventionalism as well as those wanting to deepen their knowledge about these questions.
410  0$aLaw and Philosophy Library,$x1572-4395 ;$v126
606   $aLaw?Philosophy
606   $aLaw
606   $aPolitical science
606   $aConstitutional law
606   $aTheories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/R11011
606   $aPhilosophy of Law$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E27000
606   $aConstitutional Law$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/R17028
615  0$aLaw?Philosophy.
615  0$aLaw.
615  0$aPolitical science.
615  0$aConstitutional law.
615 14$aTheories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History.
615 24$aPhilosophy of Law.
615 24$aConstitutional Law.
676   $a340.1
702   $aRamírez-Ludeña$b Lorena$4edt$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
702   $aVilajosana$b Josep M$4edt$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910337832303321
996   $aLegal conventionalism$91743119
997   $aUNINA