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101 0 $aeng
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181   $ctxt$2rdacontent
182   $cc$2rdamedia
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200 10$aStructural Rationality and Other Essays on Practical Reason /$fby Julian Nida-Rümelin
205   $a1st ed. 2019.
210  1$aCham :$cSpringer International Publishing :$cImprint: Springer,$d2019.
215   $a1 online resource (144 pages)
225 1 $aTheory and Decision Library A:, Rational Choice in Practical Philosophy and Philosophy of Science,$x0921-3384 ;$v52
311   $a3-319-95506-3 
327   $aIntroduction and Overview -- Chapter1. Acting on Beliefs -- Chapter2. Structures of Agency -- Chapter3. Reasons for Action -- Chapter4. Cooperation -- Chapter5. Communication -- Chapter6. Structural Intentions -- Chapter7. Weakness of Will -- Chapter8. Structural Coherence.
330   $aIn this book, the author shows that it is necessary to enrich the conceptual frame of the theory of rational choice beyond consequentialism. He argues that consequentialism as a general theory of rational action fails and that this does not force us into the dichotomy teleology vs deontology. The unity of practical reason can be saved without consequentialism. In the process, he presents insightful criticism of standard models of action and rational choice. This will help readers discover a new perspective on the theory of rationality. The approach is radical: It transcends the reductive narrowness of instrumental rationality without denying its practical impact. Actions do exist that are outlined in accordance to utility maximizing or even self-interest maximizing. Yet, not all actions are to be understood in these terms. Actions oriented around social roles, for example, cannot count as irrational only because there is no known underlying maximizing heuristic. The concept of bounded rationality tries to embed instrumental rationality into a form of life to highlight limits of our cognitive capabilities and selective perceptions. However, the agent is still left within the realm of cost-benefit-reasoning. The idea of social preferences or meta-preferences cannot encompass the plurality of human actions. According to the author they ignore the plurality of reasons that drive agency. Hence, they coerce agency in fitting into a theory that undermines humanity. His theory of structural rationality acknowledges lifeworld patterns of interaction and meaning. .
410  0$aTheory and Decision Library A:, Rational Choice in Practical Philosophy and Philosophy of Science,$x0921-3384 ;$v52
606   $aPhilosophy and social sciences
606   $aAnalysis (Philosophy)
606   $aPhilosophy
606   $aTheory (Philosophy)
606   $aPhilosophy of the Social Sciences$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E36000
606   $aAnalytic Philosophy$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E39000
606   $aPhilosophical Methodology$3https://scigraph.springernature.com/ontologies/product-market-codes/E50000
615  0$aPhilosophy and social sciences.
615  0$aAnalysis (Philosophy).
615  0$aPhilosophy.
615  0$aTheory (Philosophy).
615 14$aPhilosophy of the Social Sciences.
615 24$aAnalytic Philosophy.
615 24$aPhilosophical Methodology.
676   $a146.4
700   $aNida-Rümelin$b Julian$4aut$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut$0428781
906   $aBOOK
912   $a9910337683603321
996   $aStructural Rationality and Other Essays on Practical Reason$92179887
997   $aUNINA