LEADER 10396 am 22007933u 450 001 9910297043003321 005 20230621141356.0 010 $a3-631-75447-7 024 7 $a10.3726/b13965 035 $a(CKB)4100000007276965 035 $a(OAPEN)1003220 035 $a(oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/32664 035 $a(MiAaPQ)EBC30686314 035 $a(Au-PeEL)EBL30686314 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000007276965 100 $a20200116h20062006 fy 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $aurm|#---auuuu 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aHyperinflation, currency board, and bust $ethe case of Argentina /$fJutta Maute 205 $a1st ed. 210 $aBern$cPeter Lang International Academic Publishing Group$d2018 210 1$aFrankfurt am Main, Germany :$cPeter Lang,$d[2006] 210 31$aFrankfurt am Main, Germany :$cPeter Lang,$d[2018] 210 4$d©2006 215 $a1 online resource (289 pages) $cillustrations, charts; digital, PDF file(s) 225 1 $aHohenheimer volkswirtschaftliche Schriften ;$vBand 56 300 $aAlso published as the author?s doctoral thesis: Hohenheim, 2006. 311 08$aPrint version: 9783631556085 320 $aIncludes bibliographical references. 327 $aCover -- FIGURES -- ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS -- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS -- 1 INTRODUCTION -- 2 ARGENTINA'S STABILISATION CHALLENGE -- 2.1 PRECEDING STABILISATION ATTEMPTS SINCE THE DAYS OF PERÓN -- 2.2 HIGH AND HYPERINFLATION IN ARGENTINA IN THE 1980s -- 2.2.1 Rising Money Stock -- 2.2.2 Government Finance -- 2.2.2.1 Inflationary Bias of Governments -- 2.2.2.2 Debt Structure -- 2.2.2.3 Are Budget Deficits a Cause or a Consequence of Inflation? -- 2.2.2.4 Erosion of Tax System -- 2.2.2.5 Lack of Structured Budgeting Process -- 2.2.2.6 Inflation Tax -- 2.2.3 Monetary Regime -- 2.2.3.1 Monetary Constitution -- 2.2.3.2 Monetary Policy -- 2.2.4 Inflation Expectations -- 2.2.5 Symptoms of High Inflation -- 2.2.5.1 Decreasing Demand for Real Money Stock -- 2.2.5.2 Currency Substitution -- 2.2.5.3 Undervaluation as a Consequence of Currency Substitution -- 2.2.5.4 Acceleration and Variability of Inflation -- 2.2.5.5 Real Price and Wage Variability -- 2.2.5.6 Distortion and Excess Variability of Relative Prices -- 2.2.5.7 Contracting Strategies -- 2.2.5.8 Disappearance of Markets -- 2.2.5.9 Economic Performance -- 2.2.5.10 External Trade -- 2.2.5.11 Distributional Effects of High Inflation -- 2.2.6 From High to Hyperinflation -- 2.3 OPTIONS FOR STABILISATION IN THE BEGINNING 1990s -- 2.3.1 Political Feasibility of Reforms -- 2.3.2 Shape of Reforms Ending Hyperinflation -- 2.3.2.1 Monetary and Fiscal Reform -- 2.3.2.2 External Anchor: Fixing the Exchange Rate -- 2.3.3 Argentina's Choice -- 3 STABILISATION VIA CURRENCY BOARD -- 3.1 THE CURRENCY BOARD IDEA -- 3.1.1 The Term -- 3.1.2 The Concept -- 3.1.3 Currency Board vs. Other Fixed Exchange Rate Arrangements -- 3.1.4 Currency Board vs. Central Bank -- 3.1.5 Excursus: Doctrinal History and the Currency Board Idea -- 3.1.5.1 Doctrinal Positions: Mercantilist vs. Classical Views. 327 $a3.1.5.2 The Bullionist and Banking-Currency Controversies -- The Early 19th Century Bullionist Controversy -- The 1840s Banking-Currency Controversy -- Findings with Hindsight -- 3.1.5.3 The Currency Board and Classical Monetary Theory -- 3.1.5.4 From Colonial to Present-Day Currency Boards -- Rationale of Colonial Currency Boards -- Currency Boards Since 1849 -- 3.2 THE SPECIFICS AND FUNCTIONING OF A CURRENCY BOARD -- 3.2.1 Constitutional Elements of a Currency Board -- 3.2.1.1 Anchor Currency -- 3.2.1.2 Fixed Exchange Rate -- 3.2.1.3 Full Convertibility -- 3.2.1.4 Conduct of Monetary Policy -- Control of Private Money Creation -- Clearing and Day-to-Day Monetary Operations -- Lender of Last Resort Function -- 3.2.1.5 Conduct of Fiscal Policy -- 3.2.1.6 Institutional Preconditions -- 3.2.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of a Currency Board -- 3.2.2.1 Strengths of a Currency Board -- Simplicity and Transparency -- Credibility -- Currency Stability -- Interest Rate Convergence -- Financial Intermediation -- 3.2.2.2 Weaknesses of a Currency Board -- Nominal Exchange Rate Rigidity and Exchange Rate Misalignments -- Financial Fragility in the Absence of a Lender of Last Resort -- Loss of Other Central Bank Functions -- Constraints on Fiscal Policy -- 3.2.3 Considerations for Adopting a Currency Board -- 3.2.3.1 When is a Currency Board an Appropriate Choice? -- 3.2.3.2 Implementation of a Currency Board -- 3.2.4 Duration and Termination of a Currency Board -- 3.2.4.1 Currency Board: Permanent or Transitional Arrangement? -- 3.2.4.2 Exit Options -- Built-in Escape Clauses -- Depreciation -- Appreciation -- Switch to a Floating Exchange Rate -- Switch in the Peg -- 3.2.5 Dual Currency Boards: An Extended Proposal for Currency Stability -- 4 THE ARGENTINE CURRENCY BOARD ARRANGEMENT -- 4.1 FEATURES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARGENTINE CBA -- 4.1.1 The Legal Fixing. 327 $a4.1.1.1 The Convertibility Law -- 4.1.1.2 The New Central Bank Law -- 4.1.2 Assessment of the Argentine CBA's Configuration -- 4.1.2.1 Orthodox and Non-Orthodox Elements -- 4.1.2.2 The Choice of the Anchor and the Rate -- 4.1.2.3 Suboptimal Currency Area -- 4.2 THE STABILISATION TRACK DURING THE 1990s -- 4.2.1 The Early 1990s' Economic Reforms -- 4.2.1.1 Further Reforms Shaping the Monetary Frame -- 4.2.1.2 Brady Restructuring -- 4.2.1.3 Tax Reforms -- 4.2.1.4 Federal Fiscal Relations -- 4.2.1.5 Privatisation and Deregulation -- 4.2.1.6 Financial Sector Reform -- 4.2.1.7 Social Security Reform -- 4.2.1.8 Labour Market Reforms -- 4.2.1.9 Trade Liberalisation -- 4.2.2 The Early 1990s' Economic Performance: 1991-1994 -- 4.2.2.1 Monetary and Financial Development -- 4.2.2.2 Economic Activity -- 4.2.2.3 Fiscal Development -- 4.2.2.4 Unemployment and Income Distribution -- 4.2.3 Coping with the Tequila Crisis: 1995 -- 4.2.3.1 The Tequila Effect -- 4.2.3.2 Currency and Bank Run -- 4.2.3.3 Managing the Crisis -- 4.2.3.4 Financial Sector Reforms in the Wake of Tequila -- 4.2.3.5 Fiscal Adjustment Following Tequila -- 4.2.4 The Second Expansionary Phase after Tequila: 1996-1998 -- 4.2.5 The Late 1990s' Recession: 1999-2001 -- 4.2.5.1 The Asian, Russian, and Brazilian Crises -- 4.2.5.2 More Adverse External Shocks -- 4.2.5.3 Recession cum Deflation -- 4.2.5.4 Real Appreciation of the Peso -- 4.2.5.5 Fiscal Atrophy -- 4.2.5.6 Limited Financial Sector Robustness -- 4.2.5.7 Further Labour Market Reforms -- 4.2.6 The Run Up to the Collapse: 2001 -- 4.2.6.1 Meddling with the CBA -- 4.2.6.2 Emission of Quasi-Monies -- 4.2.6.3 Social and Political Overflow, and the End of the CBA -- 4.2.7 A Sketch of the Post-Collapse -- 5 WHAT WENT WRONG? -- 5.1 THE MAIN SUSPECTS -- 5.1.1 Fiscal Imbalance -- 5.1.1.1 Persistent Budget Deficits -- 5.1.1.2 Total Indebtedness. 327 $a5.1.2 Overvalued Exchange Rate -- 5.1.2.1 Real Appreciation before 1998 -- 5.1.2.2 The Real Exchange Rate after 1998 -- 5.1.3 Sudden Stop -- 5.1.3.1 Leveraged Argentina -- 5.1.3.2 Debt Sustainability -- 5.1.3.3 The Sudden Stop in the Region -- 5.1.4 Shock Exacerbation within MERCOSUR -- 5.1.4.1 1994-1998: Fixed Here, Fixed plus Sterilisation There -- 5.1.4.2 1999-2001: Fixed Here, Floating plus Sterilisation There -- 5.1.4.3 Exposed within MERCOSUR -- 5.1.5 Institutional Defects -- 5.1.5.1 Insufficient Labour Market Reforms -- 5.1.5.2 Insufficient Diversification of Production -- 5.1.5.3 Banking Sector Reforms Impaired -- 5.1.5.4 Other Deficient Reforms -- 5.1.6 Politics -- 5.1.7 The IMF -- 5.1.7.1 The IMF and the CBA -- 5.1.7.2 Outline of the IMF's Engagement 1991-2001 -- 5.1.7.3 The Role of the IMF during 1991 to 2000 -- 5.1.7.4 The Role of the IMF in the Crisis -- 5.1.7.5 The Fund's Responsibilities -- 5.1.8 The Washington Consensus -- 5.1.9 The Currency Board Itself -- 5.2 TAKING STOCK -- 5.2.1 Vulnerability -- 5.2.2 Triggers -- 5.3 MISSED OPPORTUNITIES? -- 5.3.1 Soft Exit during 1993/1994 -- 5.3.2 Soft Exit during the Second Expansionary Phase -- 5.3.3 Hard Exit after the External Shocks of the Late Nineties -- 5.3.4 Exit towards Full Dollarisation until 1999 -- 5.3.5 Dollarisation in the Midst of Crisis -- 6 CONCLUSION -- Some Lessons -- Argentina's New Challenge -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- STATISTICAL APPENDIX -- Macro Indicators -- Financial and Banking Indicators -- Fiscal Indicators -- Distribution and Poverty Indicators -- Selected Data. 330 $aThis book focuses on «Convertibilidad», the latest Argentine experience of exchange rate based stabilisation, and aims at isolating the main causes for its tragic collapse in 2001-2002. The characteristics of Argentina?s high and hyperinflation during the 1980s are analysed, and the theory of currency boards is expounded. The stabilisation tool, an institutionally highly credible currency board arrangement (CBA), though highly effective, could not be an optimal long-term solution, given the country?s structural and trade characteristics. The analysis of the causes of the CBA?s collapse yields a complex picture of interacting factors, among them invaliding ones that had created multiple vulnerabilities over years, and triggering ones that unfolded their worst potential in meeting such vulnerable conditions. 410 0$aHohenheimer volkswirtschaftliche Schriften ;$vBand 56. 606 $aCurrency boards$zArgentina 606 $aMonetary policy$zArgentina 606 $aCurrency question$zArgentina 610 $aArgentina 610 $aArgentinien 610 $aBoard 610 $aBust 610 $aCase 610 $aCurrency 610 $aCurrency Board 610 $aFixed Exchange Rates 610 $aGeschichte 1980-2002 610 $aHyperinflation 610 $aIMF 610 $aInflation 610 $aIWF 610 $aKonvertierbarkeit 610 $aMaute 610 $aWährung 610 $aWashington Consensus 610 $aWechselkurs 615 0$aCurrency boards 615 0$aMonetary policy 615 0$aCurrency question 676 $a658.40809892 700 $aMaute$b Jutta$0913832 801 2$bUkMaJRU 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910297043003321 996 $aHyperinflation, currency board, and bust$92047480 997 $aUNINA LEADER 03589 am 22005173- 450 001 9910321955703321 005 20231214145449.0 024 7 $a10.22188/kriterium.15 035 $a(CKB)4100000008169012 035 $a(OAPEN)1004952 035 $a(oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/33868 035 $a(EXLCZ)994100000008169012 100 $a20190514d2019 xx uy 0 101 0 $aswe 135 $auuuuu---auuuu 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 00$aDe samhällsbesvärliga 210 $aGothenburg$cKriterium$d2019 215 $a1 online resource (384) 311 $a91-7061-761-9 330 $a"In inter-war Sweden, the psychiatric diagnosis of psychopathy served as a controversial but powerful tool for the management of people who failed to live up to contemporary civic ideals. The diagnosis was based on theories of a broad spectrum of biologically-based disorders in the borderland between normality and actual mental illness. The disturbances were assumed to manifest themselves as, for example, homosexuality, hysterical attacks, emotional coldness, mythomania, or restlessness. Another controversial diagnosis was paranoia querulans or querulous paranoia, a disease that was linked to the emergence of the modern state and its rule of law, and thought to manifest itself mainly in hyperbolic complaints against supposed wrongdoings. Thus, the disorder implicated an excessive use of one's civil rights. A particular dilemma related to this disease was that the kind of behaviour that had usually led to the diagnosis and subsequent psychiatric confinement, namely a ardent manner of writing letters to public authorities, was precisely what was required for discharge. In De samhällsbesvärliga (The Social Troublemakers), historian of science and ideas Annika Berg examines how patients described as psychopaths or querulants could negotiate for discharge with doctors and authorities in 1930s and 40s Sweden. This was a period in time when the system of psychiatric care in Sweden was greatly expanded in answer to a perceived shortage, but was also transformed into a somewhat more open apparatus with possibilities to apply for preliminary discharge and other forms of outpatient solutions. It was also a time when psychiatry was under attack from different quarters, and psychiatrists were accused of using flexible diagnoses such as psychopathy to confine people wrongly. Against this backdrop, how did the management of psychopaths and querulants fit with contemporary ideals of citizenship and democracy? How did the patients view themselves? And how were negotiations in individual cases affected by notions of, for example, class, gender and sexuality?" 606 $aHistory$2bicssc 606 $aSocial & cultural history$2bicssc 606 $aSocial services & welfare, criminology$2bicssc 606 $aMedicolegal issues$2bicssc 606 $aHistory of medicine$2bicssc 606 $aPsychiatry$2bicssc 610 $aPsychiatry 610 $aPsychopathy 610 $aParanoia querulans 610 $aDiagnoses 610 $aconfinement 610 $aintersectionality 615 7$aHistory 615 7$aSocial & cultural history 615 7$aSocial services & welfare, criminology 615 7$aMedicolegal issues 615 7$aHistory of medicine 615 7$aPsychiatry 700 $aBerg$b Annika$4aut$0964422 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910321955703321 996 $aDe samhällsbesvärliga$92187914 997 $aUNINA