LEADER 03888 am 2200589 n 450 001 9910313024303321 005 20180216 010 $a2-35596-004-6 024 7 $a10.4000/books.irasec.833 035 $a(CKB)4960000000012705 035 $a(FrMaCLE)OB-irasec-833 035 $a(oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/56504 035 $a(PPN)230000592 035 $a(EXLCZ)994960000000012705 100 $a20180703j|||||||| ||| 0 101 0 $aeng 135 $auu||||||m|||| 181 $ctxt$2rdacontent 182 $cc$2rdamedia 183 $acr$2rdacarrier 200 10$aPolicies of the Thai State towards the Malay Muslim South (1978-2010) /$fSor Rattanamanee Polkla, Arnaud Dubus 210 $aBangkok $cInstitut de recherche sur l?Asie du Sud-Est contemporaine$d2018 215 $a1 online resource (112 p.) 330 $aIt was one of these landmark special programs at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand, on the top floor of the Maneeya Centre Building, in the upscale commercial heart of Bangkok, where Major General Pichet Wisaijorn was the exclusive guest speaker on that evening of November 2009. Many of the journalists, both Thai and Foreign, were present and Khun Roong and the other staff at the bar were working non-stop, dropping pizza here and glasses of dark beer there. Expectations were high. Pichet was the Fourth Army Region commander, which includes the three ?problematic provinces? of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, plus a few unruly districts in the Songkhla province. Since 2003, thousands of people, rubber tappers, insurgents, traders, school teachers, civil servants, police officers, military personnel and some foreigners had been killed in a maelstrom of violence linked to what was officially called the ?separatist insurgency? by the authorities as well as linked to the mafia culture prevailing in this region. The trafficking of women, drug peddling, extortion, smuggling of palm oil and cheap electronic items from Malaysia have always been rife in the deep South. This mafia culture is prevailing in many of Thailand's 77 provinces, but the total breakdown of law and order in the South makes it worse. Many in the audience were thinking that General Pichet would deliver some answers to the most important questions which have puzzled journalists, businessmen and other residents for years: who leads the insurgency? What are their objectives? How the movement is structured, or is it even structured at all? What is the division of power between the Southern Border Provincial Administrative Committee, the armed forces, the local administration and the central government? Have there been any attempts to negotiate with the insurgents? But the presentation of Pichet was rather disappointing. What is the direction of their policy? Pichet repeated the royally endorsed? 517 $aPolicies of the Thai State towards the Malay Muslim South 606 $aMuslims$xGovernment policy$zThailand 607 $aThailand, Southern$xPolitics and government 607 $aThailand$xPolitics and government$y1988- 610 $asectarianism 610 $amuslim populations 610 $aethnicity 610 $aminorities 610 $anational security policy 610 $aMalaysia 610 $aThailand 610 $amarginalization 610 $ainsurgency 610 $aseparatism 610 $asouthern provinces 610 $aintegration 610 $aInsurrection 610 $aMalay 610 $aconflict 615 0$aMuslims$xGovernment policy 700 $aRattanamanee Polkla$b Sor$01291240 701 $aDubus$b Arnaud$01233390 712 02$aIRASEC. 801 0$bFR-FrMaCLE 906 $aBOOK 912 $a9910313024303321 996 $aPolicies of the Thai State towards the Malay Muslim South (1978-2010)$93021809 997 $aUNINA